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REFERRAL OF TOXIC CHEMICAL REGULATION 
UNDER THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: 
EPA'S ADMINISTRATIVE DUMPING GROUND 
Cynthia Ruggerio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA or the Act)! out of a concern for the effects of toxic chemicals 
on human health and the environment. 2 The Act provides a statutory 
basis for comprehensive identification and control of chemicals that 
pose an unreasonable risk to human health or the environment. 3 
Although federal toxic substances regulation existed prior to TSCA, 
earlier regulation did not comprehensively control the complex prob-
lems posed by the use of toxic substances. Rather, prior legislation 
was designed to allow administrative agencies to regulate particular 
hazards within their limited jurisdiction by considering a given chem-
ical in isolation from its known collateral effects. 4 
The restrictive scope of pre-TSCA legislation gave rise to signifi-
cant regulatory gaps concerning toxic substances. The Act was a 
congressional response to the failure of earlier, narrowly-focused 
legislation intended to provide for complementary and supplemen-
tary assistance to preceding laws and to ensure effective overall 
control of toxic substances. 5 
* Associate, Monteverde, Hemphill, Maschmeyer & Obert, Philadelphia, PA; B.S., Fairfield 
University, 1984; J.D., Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, 1987. The author would 
like to thank Nicholas A. Ashford, Associate Professor of Technology and Policy, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, for his assistance in the preparation of this 
Article. 
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
2 OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT 7 (1980) [hereinafter OTS, TSCAj. 
3 [d. 
4 D. DONIGER, THE LAW AND POLICY OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE CONTROL: A CASE STUDY OF 
VINYL CHLORIDE 144-46 (1978). 
5 See id. at 144. 
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Despite the efforts of Congress to resolve the serious regulatory 
problems involved in controlling toxic substances through TSCA, 
the Act, now thirteen years of age, has proven ineffective. There 
are two central reasons for the disappointing results of TSCA reg-
ulation: first, the Act contains legislative loopholes that significantly 
impair its effectiveness; and second, the Act is administered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency), and, like 
all administrative agencies, the EPA is subject to powerful political 
pressures in carrying out its responsibilities. The EPA has used the 
legislative loopholes within the Act as advantageous tools in meeting 
the political goal of the times, deregulation. 
Section 9 of TSCA provides a mechanism for the EPA to refer 
regulatory responsibility under TSCA to other administrative agen-
cies for regulation under the statutes that they administer, or to a 
branch of the EPA under a different EPA-administered statute. 6 
6 See 15 u.s.c. § 2608 (1982). Section 9 reads as follows: 
(a) Laws Not Administered by the Administrator 
(1) If the Administrator has reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, 
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or 
mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment and determines, in the 
Administrator's discretion, that such risk may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient 
extent by action taken under a Federal law not administered by the Administrator, 
the Administrator shall submit to the agency which administers such law a report 
which describes such risk and includes in such description a specification of the activity 
or combination of activities which the Administrator has reason to believe so presents 
such risk. Such report shall also request such agency -
(A) (i) to determine if the risk in such report may be prevented or reduced 
to a sufficient extent by action taken under such law, and (ii) if the agency 
determines that such risk may be so prevented or reduced, to issue an order 
declaring whether or not the activity or combination of activities specified 
in the description of such risk presents such risk; and 
(B) to respond to the Administrator with respect to the matters described 
in subparagraph (A). 
Any report of the Administrator shall include a detailed statement of the infor-
mation on which it is based and shall be published in the Federal Register. The 
agency receiving a request under such a report shall make the requested determi-
nation, issue the requested order, and make the requested response within such time 
as the Administrator specifies in the request, but such time specified may not be less 
than 90 days from the date the request was made. The response of an agency shall 
be accompanied by a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the agency 
and shall be published in the Federal Register. 
(2) If the Administrator makes a report under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
chemical substance or mixture and the agency to which such report was made either-
(A) issues an order declaring that the activity or combination of activities 
specified in the description of the risk described in the report does not 
present the risk described in the report, or 
(B) initiates, within 90 days of the publication in the Federal Register of 
the response of the agency under paragraph (1), action under the law (or 
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Although section 9 was intended to prevent jurisdictional overlap 
and inefficient use of administrative resources,7 it hasjnstead become 
an escape hatch for the EPA to avoid regulatory responsibility that 
it should legitimately exercise. 
[d. 
laws) administered by such agency to protect against such risk associated 
with such activity or combination of activities, 
the Administrator may not take any action under section 2605 or 2606 of this title 
with respect to such risk. 
(3) If the Administrator has initiated action under section 2605 or 2606 of this title 
with respect to a risk associated with a chemical substance or mixture which was the 
subject of a report made to an agency under paragraph (1), such agency shall before 
taking action under the law (or laws) administered by it to protect against such risk 
consult with the Administrator for the purpose of avoiding duplication of Federal 
action against suc,h risk. 
(b) Laws Administered by the Administrator 
The Administrator shall coordinate action taken under this Act with actions taken 
under other Federal laws administered in whole or in part by the Administrator. If 
the Administrator determines that a risk to health or the environment associated 
with a chemical substance or mixture could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient 
extent by actions taken under the authorities contained in such other Federal laws, 
the Administrator shall use such authorities to protect against such risk unless the 
Administrator determines, in the Administrator's discretion, that it is in the public 
interest to protect against such risk by actions taken under this Act. This subsection 
shall not be construed to relieve the Administrator of any requirement imposed on 
the Administrator by such other Federal laws. 
(c) Occupational Safety and Health 
In exercising any authority under this Act, the Administrator shall not, for pur-
poses of section 653(b)(I) of title 29 [(the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970)], be deemed to be exercising statutory authority to prescribe or enforce stan-
dards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health. 
(d) Coordination 
In administering this Act, the Administrator shall consult and coordinate with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of any other appropriate 
Federal executive . department or agency, any relevant independent regulatory 
agency, and any other appropriate instrumentality of the Federal Government for 
the purpose of achieving the maximum enforcement of this chapter while imposing 
the least burdens of duplicative requirements on those subject to the chapter and for 
other purposes. The Administrator shall, in the report required by section 2629 of 
this title, report annually to the Congress on actions taken to coordinate with such 
other Federal departments, agencies, or instrumentalities, and on actions taken to 
coordinate the authority under this Act with the authority granted under other Acts 
referred to in subsection (b) of this section. 
7 The House Report, prepared by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, states the basis of TSCA legislation as follows: 
[A]uthority is needed to require testing of chemicals to determine their health and 
environmental effects, to impose use and distribution restrictions on chemicals where 
necessary to protect the public health and environment, and to collect information 
on chemicals and establish a system for classifying and using such information. 
Present authorities for protecting against and regulating hazardous chemicals are 
fragmented and inadequate. Although there are a number of Federal laws which now 
provide some authority for regulation (e.g., the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water 
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The unfortunate misuse of section 9 power by the EPA has par-
ticularly affected the control of toxic substances in areas regulated 
by federal statutes other than TSCA, statutes that TSCA was orig-
inally intended to supplement. 8 For example, the EPA implemented 
a policy to refer regulatory responsibility for all toxic substances 
that are in any way associated with the workplace9 to the Occupa-
Pollution Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and the 
Consumer Product Safety Act) conspicuous gaps exist in the protections provided by 
such laws. Most significant among the deficiencies are the following: 
(1) In general such laws provide regulatory authority which is not set in 
motion until after human or environmental exposure to a harmful chemical 
has occurred. 
(2) The authorities provided to reduce or eliminate the harmful exposure 
to a chemical may not be adequate or may be cumbersome or inefficient. 
(3) No authority exists for collection of data to determine the totality of 
human and environmental exposure to chemicals. 
In summary, the country faces serious risks of harm to the health of its people and 
to its environment from the substantial use which is made of chemicals, and Federal 
law is clearly inadequate to deal with such risks. A major element in our efforts to 
improve the nation's health and environment must be the enactment of protective 
legislation such as H.R. 14032. The overriding purpose of the bill is to provide 
protection of health and the environment through authorities which are designed to 
prevent harm. 
H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 6, 7 (1976) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], 
reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 412, 414, 415 (1976) [here-
inafter TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
Similarly, the Senate Report, prepared by the Senate Committee on Commerce, describes 
the need for TSCA legislation as follows: 
In order to protect against [the] dangers [of toxic chemical exposure], the proposed 
Toxic Substances Control Act would close a number of major regulatory gaps, for 
while certain statutes, including the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, may be used to protect health and the environment from chemical 
substances, none of these statutes provide the means for discovering adverse effects 
on health and environment before manufacture of new chemical substances. Under 
these other statutes, the Government regulator's only response to chemical dangers 
is to impose restrictions after manufacture begins. 
The proposed Toxic Substances Control Act provides a far more effective mecha-
nism to protect against dangerous chemical materials contained in consumer and 
industrial products. While air and water pollution laws authorize limitations on dis-
charges and emission and the Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes work-
place ambient standards, there are no statutes (except the fuel additives provisions 
of the Clean Air Act) which authorize the direct control of such chemicals for their 
health or environmental effects. 
S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 
TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 161. 
8 See D. DONIGER, supra note 4, at 142. 
929 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). 
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tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which administers 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).lo As a result of 
this activity, regulation under the OSH Act has increased. Increased 
use of the OSH Act, rather than more effective exercise of the TSCA 
enforcement powers, has significantly heightened the impact of dan-
gerous toxic substances in the workplace because the OSH Act is 
much weaker than TSCA and no OSHA reform is in sight. 
This Article addresses the EPA's abuse of its administrative duty 
under TSCA through section 9 referral of regulatory responsibility 
to other administrative agencies. The impact of section 9 referrals 
on toxic substance regulation is most apparent when referral from 
TSCA to the OSH Act is considered. For this reason, delegation to 
OSHA serves as the primary example of section 9 referral through-
out this Article. 
Part II of this Article reviews the purpose of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act. The shortcomings of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act with respect to workplace regulation of toxic substances 
are addressed in order to give the reader a better understanding of 
TSCA's intended role as a supplement to prior inadequate legisla-
tion. Part II also provides a brief outline of the regulatory mandates 
within TSCA. Then, Part III describes the mechanics of section 9 
referrals. Following this general discussion, specific examples of 
section 9 referrals are documented and analyzed in Part IV. Finally, 
the Article sets forth proposals for reform designed to eliminate the 
section 9 loophole in Part V. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 
A. The Purpose of TSCA 
The purpose of the Toxic Substances Control Act is to identify 
and control comprehensively chemicals that pose an unreasonable 
risk to human health or the environment. 11 Although several other 
laws existed prior to TSCA that addressed the regulation of toxic 
10 See Memorandum on Section 9(a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act from Gerald H. 
Yamada, Acting EPA General Counsel, to Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator (June 7,1985) 
(available at Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Section 9(a) 
Memorandum]. For a discussion of the shift of responsibility under TSCA from EPA to other 
agencies, see 1986 Dawns with New Focus on Chemical Regulatory Programs for Toxic 
Substances, Pesticides and Hazardous Materials 9 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1363 (Jan. 10, 
1986). 
11 OTS, TSCA, supra note 2, at 7; see also supra note 6. 
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substances,12 none of these prior laws provided for multi-media reg-
ulation of a toxic chemical through the entire course of its existence 
as TSCA does. 13 Pre-TSCA statutes restricted the EPA to a narrow, 
jurisdictionally-limited examination of a particular hazard, thereby 
precluding consideration of the overall impact of a particular chem-
ical. 14 
As a result of the narrow scope of federal laws predating TSCA, 
several gaps in toxic substances control policy emerged. The most 
notable deficiency of pre-TSCA legislation is that such statutes, 
which include the Occupational Safety and Health Act,15 the Clean 
Air Act,16 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,17 do not 
12 See POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: OVERVIEW AND 
EVALUATION 158 (l982) [hereinafter POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT]. In 1980, 24 federal laws 
existed to regulate chemicals that threaten human health. [d. 
13 See Miller, Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 3-4, in GOV'T INSTS., INC., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 309-10 (lOth ed. 1989) [hereinafter GI, HANDBOOK]. Marshall Lee 
Miller, who served as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Department of Labor, Special Assistant to the first Administrator of the EPA 
and Chief EPA Judicial Officer, explained the need for TSCA: 
Prior to the passage of the Toxic Substances Control Act, significant gaps existed in 
the federal government's authority to test and regulate problem chemicals. The Clean 
Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and other laws dealt with chemical 
substances only when they entered the environment as wastes (emissions to the air 
or discharges into the water). In many cases, controls could not be easily fashioned 
or required without severe economic consequences. Toxic substances legislation, 
which theoretically would require testing before a chemical reached the production 
phase, overcame this difficulty. 
Other statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, deal only with one phase of the chemical's existence (worker 
exposure or direct consumer exposure) and contain no authority to address environ-
mental hazards. While both of these statutes are clearly needed, the life cycle of a 
chemical, from production to ultimate disposal, provides many opportunities for its 
escape into the environment and human exposure, and federal authority to deal with 
the overall cycle is fragmented. The Toxic Substances Control Act was designed to 
fill these gaps, both in regulatory powers and in authority to require that tests be 
conducted before the human or environmental exposure occurs. 
[d. For a discussion of TSCA's legislative history, see supra note 7. 
14 See Miller, supra note 13, in GI, HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 308-09, which cites specific 
instances where jurisdictional limitations hampered effective toxic substance regulation prior 
to the enactment of TSCA. For example, while highly toxic organic mercury emissions were 
regulated under the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as of 1972, 
no federal authority existed to regulate mercury use in industrial, commercial and consumer 
products or to monitor the introduction of the chemical into the environment. Similar situations 
existed with respect to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), vinyl chloride (VOCs), and kepone. 
[d. 
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982). 
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
17 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
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allow for implementation of regulatory action with respect to a par-
ticular toxic substance until human exposure to a given chemical is 
imminent or has occurred. 18 Accordingly, by the time the regulatory 
agency takes action, the harmful effects of such exposure may have 
already taken place. Further, most laws predating TSCA fail to offer 
direct remedial avenues to those persons who are subject to such 
toxic chemical exposure. In addition to such inadequacies, it is also 
important to note that, prior to TSCA, few laws incorporated any 
means to force industry to share in the financial burdens of toxic 
substance regulation. 19 
The above-noted deficiencies of laws predating TSCA highlight 
only a few of the regulatory pitfalls that characterize such statutes. 
A brief analysis of the shortcomings of the OSH Act with respect to 
toxic substance regulation is helpful in ascertaining a more thorough 
understanding of the inefficiency of pre-TSCA regulation. 
B. The Inefficiency of the aSH Act and the Passage of TSCA 
Congress enacted the OSH Act in 1970 to promote the welfare of 
employees by ensuring "safe and healthful working conditions."2o 
The Act revolves around the regulatory mechanism of setting ex-
18 See Miller, supra note 13, in GI, HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 310. 
In discussing the inadequacy of regulatory authority under legislation such as the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, and the Hazardous 
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), the Council on Environmental 
Quality (C.E.Q.) observed: 
[C)ontrols over effluents suffer from the limited focus of their authority. 
The obvious limitation of controls over effluents is that they generally deal with 
the problem only after it is manifest. They do not provide for obtaining information 
on potential pollutants before widespread damage has occurred. 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES 20 (1971) (emphasis in original) [herein-
after CEQ, TOXIC SUBSTANCES), reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, 
app. 1 at 783. 
19 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 7, at 414. The House Report noted with respect to pre-TSCA statutes: 
Id. 
[T)here is presently no authority to require manufacturers of potentially dangerous 
chemicals to test the chemical to determine its health and environmental effects 
before marketing. Thus, although there is some authority to remove harmful chem-
icals from the workplace, the home, etc., there is no authority which provides a 
means of assessing the safety of a chemical before exposure occurs. In addition, since 
present laws require regulatory agencies to bear the cost of testing to see if a chemical 
is safe, regulatory action often does not occur until adverse effects of a chemical 
become evident in the population or the environment. 
20 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). 
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po sure standards for specific chemicals and substances that "ade-
quately assur[e] to the extent feasible that no employees will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity. "21 
The standard-setting process under the OSH Act has proved dif-
ficult at best for OSHA22 because of the heavy substantive burden 
that the Agency faces in promulgating exposure standards. In set-
ting standards, OSHA must consider the effects of such regulatory 
action on the economy as a whole and the technological burdens 
imposed on each individual employer concerned. 23 OSHA then bears 
the burden of showing that a hazard exists, and must convincingly 
demonstrate that exposure to the chemical at the prevailing level is 
dangerous. 24 Additionally, the Agency must demonstrate that the 
benefits of reducing the health threat outweigh the costs of imposing 
regulatory demands on the employer. 25 
Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act imposes upon every employer a 
general duty to provide a safe and healthy working environment for 
his or her employees. 26 In theory, the general duty clause of section 
5(a)(1) applies to chronic health hazards caused by toxic substances, 
but such a general duty is difficult to enforce. 27 OSHA first must 
21 See id. § 655(b)(5). Under the Act, three types of standards may be imposed in order to 
regulate employee exposure: (1) permanent exposure standards may be imposed through 
notice and comment rulemaking; (2) temporary standards may be issued while final rules are 
being promulgated; and (3) emergency temporary standards may be issued to take immediate 
effect upon the determination that employees "are exposed to grave danger from exposure to 
substances or agents determined to be toxic." See id. § 655(a)-(c). 
22 Charles Adkins, OSHA's Director of Health Standards, has called for a complete overhaul 
of OSHA's workplace exposure limits. Adkins has stated with respect to existing limits that 
"it's almost criminal" that OSHA is enforcing exposure limits that are more than 20 years 
out-of-date. OSHA Seeks To Regain Control of Agenda With Planned June 1 Proposal of 
PEL Update, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 286 (May 27, 1988). 
Upon announcing the intended promulgation of new exposure limits, OSHA Administrator 
John A. Pendergrass stated that the proposed action "represents a 20-year leap forward in 
the levels of protection." The Agency predicts that the new limits would prevent 50,000 work-
related illnesses per year including cancer, liver and kidney impairments, and cardiovascular 
and respiratory diseases. Labor officials have criticized the proposal, however, since OSHA 
intends to exclude the maritime, construction, and agriculture industries and simply adopts 
standards already recommended by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH). More importantly, although new exposure limits will be implemented 
by OSHA, the Agency has no intention of issuing a rule requiring corresponding exposure 
limit monitoring to ensure that the new limits are enforced. OSHA Proposes Lower Exposure 
Limits for Workplace Exposure to Chemicals, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 324-25 (June 10, 
1988). 
23 See id. § 655(b). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. § 655(b), (0. 
26 B. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY 436 (1984). 
2'7 [d. at 452. Several general duty issues have repeatedly given rise to litigation. The issues 
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prove that there is no standard covering the hazard involved, and 
then must prove that the suspected hazard is likely to cause death 
or serious illness at the existing levels. 28 Proof based on OSHA data 
alone, however, cannot satisfy judicial review unless either the par-
ticular employer or industry concurs with OSHA's conclusion. 29 In 
other words, although OSHA's scientists30 may believe that a chronic 
health hazard exists, a specific toxin generally will not be "recog-
nized" for regulatory purposes under section 5 unless the industry 
concerned agrees with OSHA's specific conclusion. 31 Furthermore, 
upon proving that the hazard is likely to cause death or serious 
illness, the agency is limited to evaluating the feasibility of a given 
abatement method only in terms of the particular employer con-
cerned, regardless of industry-wide implications. 32 Focusing solely 
on a single employer's health and safety efforts reduces the possi-
bility of broad-scale health and safety improvements in the work-
place. 
Like other pre-TSCA regulation, the OSH Act affords no oppor-
tunity for employee suits,33 nor does it call on industry resources to 
assist in the regulation of toxic chemicals. The employee is left at 
the mercy of administrative decisions through each step of the reg-
ulatory process. Administrators make even the most preliminary 
decision on whether to attempt to regulate a specific substance34 
without employee or other public participation. 35 
range from questions of when a hazard is "recognized" to questions of when remedial methods 
are "recognized by safety experts as feasible," and, therefore, satisfy the general duty re-
quirements. See id.; see also Transcript of Meeting of National Advisory Committee on 
Occupational Safety and Health 76-79 (Jan. 15, 1980) (available at Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Washington, D.C.), reprinted in B. MINTZ, 
supra note 26, at 457--58; Memorandum from Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 
Association to OSHA, reprinted in B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 458--59. 
28 B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 446-47. 
29 See Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Field Operations Manual (Apr. 18, 
1983), reprinted in B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 461. 
30 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was established through section 
22 of the OSH Act to assist the Secretary of OSHA in carrying out the general policies of the 
Act under section 2. 29 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1982). 
31 See Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Field Operations Manual (Apr. 18, 
1983), reprinted in B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 461. 
32 See id. at 462. 
33 Section 10 of the Act enables an employee to challenge an employer abatement require-
ment issued by the Agency, however, for the period that such a challenge is pending, the 
abatement requirements issued by the Agency are suspended. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c). 
34 See B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 533-610 (1984). 
35 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(4). Although the Act contains an "act or explain" provision, it has no 
mechanism to compel the Agency to issue rules or investigate the potential for rulemaking. 
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Irrespective of the pitfalls in the statutory construction of the 
OSH Act, the reality of OSHA enforcement has rendered the statute 
virtually toothless with respect to toxic chemical regulation. 36 Delays 
in inspection and litigation due to limited funding and personnel often 
hamper the effectiveness of agency action and offer little incentive 
for employer compliance. 37 Even where OSHA can effectively man-
date regulation and flex enforcement muscle against employers and 
industry, the available penalties are so weak that from an employer's 
perspective it actually pays to continue violating the law. 38 
Only six years after the passage of the OSH Act, it was clear to 
Congress that additional legislation for toxic chemicals regulation 
was necessary. The need for such legislation was prompted not only 
by the inadequacies of existing statutes when considered individu-
ally, but also because the combination of such legislation was tan-
tamount to a disjointed and incomplete system of toxic regulation. 
36 B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 340. 
37 See Some Funding Restrictions 'Unnecessary,' Others Limit OSHA Mission, Pendergrass 
Says, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 661-62 (July 22, 1988). OSHA Administrator John Pen-
dergrass characterized limits on OSHA's 1989 financial appropriations as "unnecessary" and 
stated that the restrictions "limit the agency in carrying out its mission." Pendergrass noted, 
for example, that because the agency is financially prohibited by the Office of Management 
and Budget to conduct safety inspections in firms of 10 or fewer workers, the agency has lost 
its discretionary power to focus on small workplaces with extremely poor safety records. Id. 
38 B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 341. The failings of OSHA legislation are best articulated in 
a statement made by Nolan Hancock, Citizenship-Legislative Director of the Oil, Chemical 
and Atomic Workers International Union, before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources: 
The basic problem is that the regulatory structure of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act is so weak that it makes little difference to employers, especially in the 
oil and chemical industry, whether the OSHA inspector comes knocking at the door 
or not. 
The reason why employers assume a combative stance with OSHA has nothing to 
do with a lack of confidence or trust in OSHA. It simply pays to fight OSHA .... 
We have established a regulatory system that makes it profitable for a business to 
fight OSHA rather than comply. 
Oversight on the Administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Improvements Act 
of 1980: Hearings on S. 2153 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Services, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, table 1, at 873,875-79 (1980) (statement of Nolan Hancock, Citizenship-
Legislative Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union), cited in 
B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 341. 
A statement of Senator Schweiker in introducing a bill (which did not pass) to amend OSHA 
in 1979 is also illustrative of the general sentiment amongst legislative and labor persons that 
the OSH Act has been a failure: "What is clear 9 years after enactment is that the success of 
the act in delivering on its promise has been substantially less than overwhelming. Not only 
has the act failed to produce demonstrable benefits in workers' safety, it has created extraor-
dinary public controversy." 125 CONGo REc. 37, 135-36 (1979) (statement of Sen. Schweiker), 
cited in B. MINTZ, supra note 26, at 346-47. 
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Moreover, the growing presence of toxic chemicals required in-
creased regulatory activity to protect human health and the envi-
ronment. 39 With the enactment of TSCA, Congress intended to pro-
vide a regulatory mechanism that, if properly administered, would 
effectively close the gaps in toxic chemical regulation and provide a 
comprehensive response to the toxic substances threat. 40 
C. The Regulatory Scheme of TSCA 
The Toxic Substances Control Act provides for regulation of toxic 
substances through a precautionary approach, applying specific reg-
ulatory standards where a substantial risk of harm through exposure 
to a particular substance has been reasonably foreseen. 41 The Act is 
comprised of a three-part regulatory scheme,42 with an emphasis on 
information gathering. 43 
Section 5 of TSCA, entitled "Manufacturing and Processing N 0-
tices," forms the basis for the EPA's power to control the release of 
newly-manufactured chemicals into the stream of commerce and the 
environment. Under section 5, also known as the premanufacture 
notice provision, a company must notify the EPA of its intent to 
produce a new chemical prior to its production. 44 If a manufacturer 
deliberately fails to issue a premanufacture notice, the EPA may 
impose heavy penalties and may even prosecute the violator crimi-
nally.45 
39 It is estimated that two million chemical compounds are in existence, thousands of which 
are produced in commercial quantities. It is also estimated that an additional 250,000 new 
chemicals are being produced annually. GI, HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 308. 
40 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
41 From Microbes to Men: The New Toxic Substances Control Act and Bacterial Mutagen-
icity/Carcinogenicity Tests, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,248 (1986). 
42 Toxic Substances Control: Implementing the Regulatory Program, 3 TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL CONF. PROC. 236 (1978) [hereinafter Toxic Substances Controll. 
43 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
44 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1982). Notification must occur within 90 days. Id. Following notifi-
cation, the EPA must publish notice in the Federal Register which identifies the proposed 
chemical product, lists its intended uses, and describes the estimated toxicity of the chemical. 
Id. § 2604(d). 
45 See id. § 2615. The EPA recently instituted a new policy under section 5 which provides 
that a company which voluntarily discloses its failure to issue a PMN to the Agency will be 
credited with reduced penalties for the violation. The policy also accounts for the degree of 
risk presented by a chemical: if the undisclosed chemical is highly toxic, presenting great risk 
to human health and the environment, the penalty for failure to disclose under section 5 will 
be adjusted upward corresponding to such risk. New Policy for TSCA Section 5 Violations 
Reduces Penalties for Voluntary Disclosure, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 715-16 (Aug. 12, 
1988). 
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The Administrator must then determine whether the chemical 
presents an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment."46 In order to make such a finding, the Administrator may 
demand that the manufacturer conduct additional testing of the 
chemical under section 4 of the Act, sharing with the Agency the 
cost of such testing. 47 If the EPA finds that unreasonable risk exists, 
then section 5 empowers the Administrator to affect introduction of 
the chemical into the environment through a limit or ban on produc-
tion and distribution of the chemical. 48 
If a chemical is already in the marketplace, it may be removed or 
its use may be restricted through section 6, entitled "Regulation of 
Hazardous Chemical Substances and Mixtures. "49 Again, section 6 
46 Section 5(f) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, entitled "Protection Against Unreason-
able Risks," provides in part: 
(1) If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical 
substance with respect to which notice is required by subsection (a) of this section, 
or that any combination of such activities, presents or will present an unreasonable 
risk of injury to health or environment before a rule promulgated under [section 6] 
can protect against such a risk, the Administrator shall ... take the action authorized 
. . . to the extent necessary to protect against such risk. 
(2) The Administrator may issue a proposed rule under [section 6(a)] to apply to a 
chemical substance . . . 
(A) a requirement limiting the amount of such substance which may be 
manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce, 
(B) a requirement described in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of 
[section 6(a)], or 
(C) any combination of the requirements referred to in subparagraph (B) 
(3)(A) The Administrator may -
(i) issue a proposed order to prohibit the manufacture, processing, or 
distribution in commerce of a substance with respect to which a finding was 
made ... 
(ii) apply ... for an injunction to prohibit the manufacture, processing, 
or distribution in commerce of such substance. 
15 U.S.C. § 2604(f). 
47Id. § 2603. 
48 I d. § 2604(f). 
49 I d. § 2605(a). Section 6(a) provides: 
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical 
substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, the Adminis-
trator shall by rule apply one or more of the following requirements to such substance 
or mixture to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the 
least burdensome requirements: 
(1) A requirement (A) prohibiting the manufacturing, processing, or distribution 
in commerce of such substance or mixture, or (B) limiting the amount of such 
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is based on the unreasonable risk standard. 50 Further, like section 
5, a section 6 EPA action may include a demand for chemical testing 
in order to determine if a chemical meets the unreasonable risk 
threshold. 51 When the EPA finds such a risk, section 6 offers the 
Agency the flexibility to prohibit or limit the manufacture, process-
ing, or distribution of the toxin;52 to limit its use or prohibit a specific 
use of the chemical;53 or to require warning labels and instructions 
for use and disposal of the chemical. 54 
Despite the potential for comprehensive regulation under section 
6, the powers it creates have been invoked sparingly by the EPA 
since the enactment of TSCA.55 The reason for the Agency's reluct-
ance in bringir.g section 6 enforcement actions stems from the bur-
densome requirement that such regulation be supported by substan-
tial evidence on the entire record in order to satisfy judicial review. 56 
Id. 
substance or mixture which may be manufactured, processed, or distributed in com-
merce. 
(2) A requirement -
(A) prohibiting the manufacture, processing, or distribution in commerce 
of such substance . . . for (i) a particular use or (ii) a particular use in a 
concentration in excess of a level specified by the Administrator .... 
(B) limiting the amount of such substance . . . for (i) a particular use . . . 
(3) A requirement that such substance or mixture ... be marked with ... clear 
and adequate warnings and instructions with respect to its use, distribution in com-
merce, or disposal or with respect to any combination of such activities .... 
(4) A requirement that manufacturers and processors of such substance or mixture 
make and retain records of the processes used to manufacture or process . . . and 
monitor or conduct tests ... to assure compliance ... . 
(5) A requirement prohibiting or ... regulating ... commercial use of such 
substance .... 
(6)(A) A requirement prohibiting or ... regulating ... disposal of such substances 
(7) A requirement directing manufacturers or processors ... (A) to give notice of 
such unreasonable risk of injury to distributors in commerce ... (B) to give public 
notice of such risk of injury .... 
50 Id. 
51Id. § 2603. 
52 I d. § 2605(a). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Miller, supra note 13, at 35, in GI, HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 34l. 
56 Members of Congress and OTS officials agree that the requirement of substantial evidence 
on the entire rulemaking record under sections 6 and 7 has thwarted enforcement efforts 
under TSCA. Elkins Says Some TSCA Requirements Slow Action on Suspect Existing 
Chemicals, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 1012-13 (Oct. 7, 1988); see also supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
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Section 7 of the Act provides the means for the EPA to obtain a 
judicial order for seizure or recall of a substance that is "imminently 
hazardous. "57 As with section 6, the degree of proof required to meet 
the imminent hazard threshold in order to invoke section 7 relief 
action is high. 58 Consequently, the EPA has yet to regulate under 
this provision at all, and has rarely even considered doing so. 59 
Significantly, TSCA gives private citizens an opportunity to chal-
lenge certain administrative actions under the Act. Any citizen may 
petition the EPA for issuance, amendment, or repeal of an admin-
istrative rule promulgated under TSCA.60 Furthermore, a private 
individual has the right to institute suit to compel Agency perfor-
mance of a nondiscretionary duty, or to sue any party in violation of 
the Act. 61 
Recognizing that toxic substances are present in a number of 
different media and may effect several different groups of people, 
TSCA provided for an Interagency Testing Committee. 62 This com-
mittee includes representatives from the EPA, OSHA, the Council 
on Environmental Quality, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, and a number of other groups that are involved in or affected 
by toxic substance regulation. 63 Although the Interagency Testing 
Committee is an important factor in TSCA enforcement, it deals 
strictly with the testing aspects of the Act, not the general inter-
agency relationships created through TSCA.64 
A committee designated to deal with broad issues of inter-agency 
relationships and jurisdictional concerns was created under the 
Carter Administration. 65 This group, the Toxic Substances Advisory 
Committee, was assigned to assist the EPA Administrator in TSCA 
decisionmaking during its short existence. 66 The committee was com-
prised of members from various governmental sectors, members of 
industry, labor, academe, and public interest groupS.67 It effectively 
fulfilled its duty to oversee EPA administration of TSCA.68 The 
57 15 U.S.C. § 2606. 
58 See Miller, supra note 13, at 35, in GI, HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 341. 
59Id. 
60 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a). 
61 I d. § 2619(a). 
62 Toxic Substances Control, supra note 42, at 161. 
63 Id. 
64 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e). 
65 Toxic Substances Control, supra note 42, at 161. 
fId Id. 
67 I d. at 164. 
68 Id. 
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committee successfully regulated various toxic substances under 
TSCA rather than under older, less stringent legislation, and thus 
fulfilled the purposes of the Act. Unfortunately, since the dissolution 
of the Toxic Substances Advisory Committee, no similar oversight 
body has been active. Partly as a result of this inactivity, compre-
hensive regulation of toxic substances under TSCA has been unat-
tainable. 
Although the Carter Administration established the committee in 
the hope of encouraging inter-agency cooperation and harmony, sub-
sequent administrations have largely ignored this goal. Thus, despite 
the legislative intent that TSCA be administered in a comprehensive 
manner, the EPA has administered TSCA centrally, and active in-
terdisciplinary evaluation has played only a minor role in enforce-
ment. 
III. THE SECTION 9 LOOPHOLE 
A. The Section 9 Referral Mechanism 
Section 9 ofTSCA, entitled "Relationship to Other Federal Laws," 
prescribes guidelines for referral of regulatory duty for a given toxic 
substance from EPA to other federal agencies or to regulatory 
branches of the EPA charged with enforcing other laws. 69 Specifi-
cally, section 9(a) provides a mechanism for EPA inter-agency re-
ferral, while section 9(b) provides a mechanism for EPA intra-agency 
referral. 70 Congress included section 9 in the Act to prevent overlap 
and unnecessary duplication of toxic substance regulation when such 
regulation might conceivably fall under the jurisdiction of more than 
one statute. 71 
69 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (1982). 
70 [d. § 2608(a)-(b). 
71 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 23, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 7, at 179; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 45, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 452. The Senate Report indicates that section 9 was "intended to 
minimize overlap and duplication between this act and other Federal laws while assuring 
protection from environmental and health dangers." SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, reprinted 
in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 23. The House Report addresses section 9 
in a like manner, noting that: 
Because other Federal laws to some extent provide for regulation of toxic chemicals, 
it is necessary to define the relationship between the regulatory authority of this bill 
and that provided under other Federal laws. It is the intent of the Committee that 
any overlapping or duplicatory regulation be avoided while providing for the fullest 
possible measure of protection to health and the environment. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 45, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
7, at 452. 
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Under the section 9(a) inter-agency referral provision, the EPA 
must submit a report to another federal agency and then withhold 
regulatory action upon making two findings: first, the EPA must 
determine that the toxic substance meets the unreasonable risk 
threshold of sections 6 and 7; and second, the EPA must determine 
whether this risk may be reduced to a sufficient extent under a law 
administered by a different federal agency. 72 
The second of the section 9(a) referral findings is both more critical 
and more controversial than the first. The sufficient extent standard 
raises important questions concerning fundamental administrative 
law issues, and it offers little guidance to the Agency in formulating 
a specific section 9(a) referral policy. The EPA power to determine, 
as an administrative agency, whether another administrative agency 
should regulate a given toxic substance is a questionable procedure 
according to traditional administrative law principles. 73 Further, be-
cause Congress failed to give the EPA direct guidance to determine 
how another agency can meet the sufficient extent standard, there 
is a great potential for the agency to ignore the comprehensive 
purpose of the Act with respect to section 9 decisions. 74 
72 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a); see also supra note 6. 
73 Although Congress may delegate power to the EPA under TSCA, is it within the EPA's 
authority to make a seemingly legislative value judgment to redelegate its own authority to 
another agency? 
74 The Agency should look to the statute as a whole, focusing on its comprehensive purpose, 
in implementing the Act, since such specific guidance is missing. For example, section 6(c) of 
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c), lists factors which the Administrator must consider in determining 
whether to promulgate a section 6(a) rule under TSCA to prohibit or limit the manufacture, 
processing, or distribution of a chemical that presents an unreasonable risk or to leave such 
regulation for that chemical to a different statute as follows: 
If the Administrator determines that a risk of injury to health or the environment 
could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under another 
Federal law (or laws) administered in whole or in part by the Administrator, the 
Administrator may not promulgate a rule under subsection (a) to protect against such 
risk of injury unless the Administrator finds, in the Administrator's discretion, that 
it is in the public interest to protect against such risk under this Chapter. In making 
such a finding the Administrator shall consider (i) all relevant aspects of the risk, 
as determined by the Administrator in the Administrator's discretion, (ii) a com-
parison of the estimated costs of complying with actions taken under this Act and 
under such law (or laws) to protect against such risk of injury. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This provision, which states that the Administrator must consider the relative costs and 
the relative efficiency of a TSCA section 6 rule for a given chemical as opposed to a similar 
rule for that chemical issued under another law, strongly suggests that relative costs and 
relative efficiency also be accounted for in the related section 9(a) delegation process. The 
EPA, however, refuses to assess such concerns under section 9(a). In so doing, the EPA 
simply ignores a comprehensive reading of the Act. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying 
text. 
The absence of judicial oversight in this area, however, has left the Agency open to formulate 
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Following a section 9(a) delegation to another federal agency, the 
second agency can act either to preclude subsequent EPA regulatory 
action or to allow it. 75 To block further EPA action, the second 
agency must issue an order stating that there is no unreasonable 
risk, or acknowledge that a risk in fact exists and initiate regulatory 
action within ninety days.76 The EPA will remain free to act if the 
second agency chooses to proceed in one of three alternative ways. 77 
The second agency may determine that its own law does not provide 
jurisdiction to act in the particular situation at hand. 78 The second 
agency may instead acknowledge that it has the authority to act but 
choose to revert regulatory responsibility to the EPA on public policy 
grounds. 79 Or, the second agency may simply do nothing, presumably 
leaving the EPA free to act, as it was before the referral. 80 
The EPA's power to delegate under section 9(a) of TSCA princi-
pally affects three other federal agencies. OSHA may be affected 
through referral from TSCA to the OSH Act if the toxic substance 
under consideration is designated a workplace problem. 81 As men-
tioned earlier, the implications of OSHA referrals will be thoroughly 
discussed throughout the Article. The EPA may also institute a 
section 9(a) referral to the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
through the Consumer Product Safety Act82 and the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act. 83 Alternatively, the Department of Trans-
portation may receive section 9(a) referrals under the Hazardous 
Materials Transportation Act84 and other federal legislation which it 
administers. 
Section 9(c) of TSCA is specifically targeted at regulatory referral 
to the OSH Act, and provides for simultaneous regulation under the 
two statutes. 85 This provision represents a direct congressional re-
its own policy with respect to the sufficient e~tent standard regardless of accepted principles 
of statutory interpretation. See infra notes 103~10 and accompanying text. 
75 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S,C. § 2608(a) (1982). 
76 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a). The question as to 
whether the EPA may respond to a subsequent contradictory statement by the second agency 
proclaiming that no unreasonable risk exists has yet to be addressed, or for that matter 
acknowledged, by EPA. 
77 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a). 
78 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a). 
79 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a). This alternative, by 
which the Agency chooses to defer back to the EPA on public policy grounds, implicitly 
supports the goals of TSCA as an act which supplements the gaps of prior legislation. 
8() Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10; 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a). 
81 The Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 Env't Rep. (BNA), Monograph No. 24, at 29 (1977). 
82 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83. 
83 [d. §§ 1261-76. 
84 [d. § 2608(d). 
85 [d. § 2608(c). The section provides that "[i]n exercising any authority under this chapter, 
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sponse to the jurisdictional limitations set forth in section 4(b)(1) of 
the OSH Act. 86 Section 4(b)(1) precludes OSHA from exercising 
regulatory authority for a particular workplace where another fed-
eral agency has a right to enforce safety and health standards for 
that same workplace. 87 Section 9(c) of TSCA, however, establishes 
that regulatory action taken under TSCA with respect to a particular 
workplace is not to be considered a bar to OSHA regulation under 
section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act. 88 Hence, EPA toxic chemical stan-
dards issued under TSCA will not preempt OSHA's authority to 
regulate a given chemical or workplace. 89 Section 9(c) ofTSCA, then, 
exhibits Congress's intent that TSCA serve as a supplementary 
regulatory mechanism to provide enforcement strength in areas 
where OSHA is weak, without completely undercutting the OSH 
Act. 90 
Based on the potential for EPA interaction with different federal 
agencies in administering TSCA, section 9(d) directs the EPA to 
consult and coordinate routinely with these other agencies while 
administering the Act. 91 Congress demanded such coordinated effort 
to meet the stated goal of "achieving the maximum enforcement of 
[TSCA] while imposing the least burden of duplicative requirements 
on those subject to the Act."92 The generalized language of 9(d) 
affords the Administrator an alternative means of referring regula-
tion from TSCA to a law administered by a different agency. The 
language of section 9(d), which is less rigorous than that of section 
9(a) from an administrative perspective, provides for referral action 
based on policy concerns. Such 9(d) referrals are known as "informal 
referrals" because they are policy-based. 
Section 9(b) governs regulatory referral from TSCA to other EPA-
administered statutes, rather than to a statute administered by a 
the Administrator shall not, for the purposes of section 653(b)(1) of Title 29, be deemed to be 
exercising statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting oc-
cupational safety and health." [d. 
86 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
S7 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(l) (1982). This OSHA jurisdictional provision states that "[n]othing in 
this Act shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal 
agencies, and State agencies acting under [section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954] 
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occu-
pational safety and health." [d. 
88 15 U.S.C. § 2608(c). 
89 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
90 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
91 15 U.S.C. § 2608(d). For the text of section 9(d), see supra note 6. 
92 15 U.S.C. § 2608(d). 
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different agency.93 EPA-administered statutes that regulate expo-
sure to toxic chemicals include the Clean Air Act,94 the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act,95 the Safe Drinking Water Act,96 the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,97 the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),98 and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).99 With the exception of CERCLA, each of these laws regu-
lates toxic chemicals, at least to some extent, in a precautionary 
fashion as TSCA does. Each of these laws, however, addresses only 
a single medium, such as air or water, and, therefore, fails to provide 
a check on toxins that encompasses all media as TSCA does. 
The section 9(b) intra-agency referral standard is similar to the 
section 9(a) standard in that the Administrator is required to refer 
regulation where the toxic hazard "could be reduced to a sufficient 
extent by the actions taken under authorities contained in ... other 
federallaws."1Oo Unlike section 9(a), however, section 9(b) allows the 
Administrator to consider whether a proposed regulatory referral is 
in the public interest. 101 In determining whether it is in the public 
interest to regulate a chemical under TSCA rather than under other 
EPA-administered laws, the Administrator may consider all relevant 
aspects of the risks presented by the chemical, the costs of regulating 
under TSCA as compared to other laws, and the relative effective-
ness of other laws. 102 
B. Problems of Section 9(a) Referral Arising From Statutory 
Language 
1. Lack of Judicial Review 
The most significant drafting deficiency with respect to section 9 
is the lack of judicial review of such referral action. Neither inter-
93Id. § 2608(b). For the text of section 9(b), see supra note 6. 
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
95 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
96 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-26 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). 
97 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). 
98 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-92k (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). 
9942 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b). 
101 Section 9(b) allows for referral of a potential TSCA problem to another EPA-administered 
statute "unless the Administrator determines. in the Administrator's discretion, that it is in 
the public interest to protect against such risk by actions taken under [TSCAj. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2608(b) (emphasis added). 
102 Id.; see also R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, THE TOXIC CONTROL SUBSTANCES ACT 66 (rev. 
ed. 1981). 
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agency nor intra-agency referrals are subject to judicial review. 
Judicial review under TSCA is limited to EPA rulemaking under 
sections 4, 5, 6, and 8,103 and rulemaking under Title II. 104 Where 
administrative action under these provisions occurs, an aggrieved 
party may obtain review before the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia or the district in which the party resides. 105 In deter-
mining whether a particular toxic substance will be referred away 
from TSCA, however, the EPA Administrator acts entirely within 
his or her own discretion. 106 
The absence of judicial review under section 9(a) places a party 
who may be directly affected by such action in a helpless situation. 
For example, a group of exposed employees may urge that a chemical 
can be more effectively regulated through TSCA rather than through 
the OSH Act because of an OSHA proposal for a weak exposure 
limit for the chemical. Indeed, as has been the case in the past, 
industry may concur with employees in such a situation. If the EPA 
chooses to refer sole regulatory responsibility to OSHA, perhaps 
only for budgetary reasons, then the parties are left with less strin-
gent standards and no means of challenging such EPA action. 
Section 9(b) intra-agency referral lacks not only a formal judicial 
check, but also a requirement that such referrals be documented by 
the Agency. 107 Accordingly, the EPA may completely shut out public 
participation in this referral arena. 
Acknowledging, at least to some extent, that inter-agency referral 
through section 9(a) is more complex than 9(b) intra-agency referral, 
Congress required that a minimal record must accompany section 
103 [d. § 2618 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The section 19 judicial review provision limits such 
review as follows: 
(a) In General 
(1)(A) Not later than 60 days after the date of the promulgation of a rule under 
section 2603(a), 2604(a)(2), 2604(b)(4), 2605(a), 2605(e), or 2607 of this chapter, or 
under subchapter II of this chapter, any person may file petition for judicial review 
of such rule with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit or for the circuit in which such person resides or in which such person's 
principle place of business is located. Courts of appeals of the United States shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of any action to obtain judicial review (other than in an 
enforcement proceeding) of such a rule if any district court of the United States 
would have had jurisdiction of such action but for this subparagraph. 
[d. § 2618(a) (Supp. v 1987). 
104 [d. Title II is also known as the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2647--55 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). 
105 See supra note 103. 
lOG 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1982). 
107 [d. § 2608(b). 
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9(a) activity. Prior to delegating regulation of a chemical to a differ-
ent agency under section 9(a), the Administrator must complete a 
detailed report documenting the specific risks presented by the 
chemical. 108 This report is then published in the Federal Register 
presumably to give interested parties notice of the proposed regu-
lation and an opportunity to comment on it. Of course, because no 
right to substantive judicial review exists, the Administrator's ob-
ligation to consider public comment cannot be enforced. An agency 
to which a referral is made then evaluates the EPA report and 
responds with a statement of findings and conclusions with respect 
thereto, which is also published in the Federal Register. 
Serious complications in the referral process may arise at the point 
where the second agency issues a response to the EPA's proposed 
9(a) action. The ultimate status of a chemical considered for section 
9(a) referral turns upon the behavior of the second agency. If the 
second agency disputes the Administrator's referral proposal, then 
it may challenge the 9(a) action explicitly by declaring its refusal to 
accept regulatory responsibility and thereby returning responsibility 
to the EPA. Alternatively, the second agency may implicitly refuse 
responsibility by taking no action upon initial EPA referral. 
These negative responses in no way ensure that the EPA will act 
subsequently to regulate on its own. 109 The distressing result is that 
regulation of a specific toxic substance that presents an unreasonable 
risk does not occur. Potential regulation falls instead into an inter-
agency "black hole" rendering future regulatory action by the EPA 
doubtful, and any means to force such action impossible. l1O 
2. Failure to Consider the Public Interest in Inter-Agency 
Referral 
A significant complication in section 9(a) inter-agency referral 
arises from the fact that it does not permit the Agency to consider 
108Id. § 2608(a). Section 9(a) requires a report where referral is suggested by the Admin-
istrator. See supra note 6. 
109 The only guidance provided in section 9 as to EPA action following a determination by 
a second agency is within section 9(a)(2), which precludes EPA action under sections 6 or 7 
of TSCA when the second agency declares that no risk exists or when the second agency 
initiates action to regulate the referred chemical. 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(2); see supra note 6. 
110 The difficulty in achieving coordinated inter-agency action under the mandates of section 
9(a) is further complicated by the fact that an agency to which the EPA delegates regulatory 
responsibility under this section has only 90 days to respond to such EPA action. See 15 
U.S.C. § 2608(a)(2)(B). Indeed, in considering the complexities of administrative agency action 
and the significant amount of red tape which must be dealt with in seeing through virtually 
all administrative tasks, 90 days is a very short period of time. 
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public interest concerns when acting under the provision. As pre-
viously noted, however, section 9(b) allows consideration of the pub-
lic interest as a factor in making referral decisions. This is an im-
portant distinction between 9(a) and 9(b) action.1l1 Inclusion of this 
public interest factor in the section 9(a) inter-agency regulatory 
decisionmaking process is necessary if the Administrator is to have 
enough flexibility to properly apply TSCA as a supplement to inad-
equate regulatory schemes. 
Once again, a comparison of toxics regulation in the workplace 
under TSCA and the OSH Act is illustrative of the need for evalu-
ation of public interest concerns in the section 9(a) referral process. 
Under TSCA, any citizen may demand that the EPA regulate a 
specific chemical, or, if regulation is already taking place, may de-
mand more stringent safeguards for a particular chemical. 112 For the 
concerned worker in an industry subject only to OSHA regulation, 
however. no similar right exists. 113 Further, because a chemical man-
ufacturer or distributor regulated under TSCA is forced to donate 
its own resources in order to enforce regulations, such employers 
are presumably aware of TSCA compliance requirements to which 
they are subject. 114 It is less likely that an OSHA-regulated employer 
will be fully aware of regulatory requirements because they are not 
required to take part in enforcement of the OSH Act. Accordingly, 
in some situations public interest concerns dictate that regulation of 
a particular chemical should be reserved for TSCA rather than re-
ferred to another agency through section 9(a). Nonetheless, these 
public interest concerns are ignored when the Agency makes a 9(a) 
decision. 
Moreover, it would seem clear that referral from the EPA to a 
different agency should require consideration as to whether such 
action is in the public interest. Each regulatory agency operates 
under completely different statutory and policy guidelines and bud-
getary constraints. The general policy concerns of the Department 
of Transportation, for example, do not encompass the same scope of 
toxic chemical regulation involved in TSCA, despite the fact that 
the Department is charged with enforcement of the Hazardous 
Waste Management Transportation Act.n5 Severe budget cuts have 
111 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
112 15 U.S.C. § 2620. 
113 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 2625(b). 
115 See CEQ, TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 18, at 20, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 783. The Council on Environmental Quality explained the differ-
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seriously impaired OSHA enforcement efforts, which should be rec-
ognized in considering OSHA as a regulatory alternative. u6 Such 
policy and budgetary variables should be accounted for in the section 
9(a) referral process through evaluation of public interest concerns. 
The exclusion of a public interest review in TSCA referral, except 
when the EPA is delegating regulatory responsibility within the 
confines of its own agency, may have been the product of legislative 
oversight. The public interest factor must be included in the section 
9(a) referral process so that TSCA can effectively supplement 
weaker pre-existing statutes in controlling exposure to toxic chem-
icals as it was intended to do.ll7 
IV. REGULATORY ACTION TAKEN UNDER SECTION 9: USE AND 
MISUSE OF SECTION 9 BY THE EPA 
A. The Attempted Referral of Asbestos in Schools 
The best example of the potential for misuse of section 9 occurred 
when the EPA attempted to thrust upon OSHA significant regula-
tory responsibility for handling the pervasive asbestos problem in 
the schools. On February 1, 1985, EPA Deputy Administrator A. 
James Barnes announced plans to refuse to regulate asbestos in 
schools under TSCA, and instead to hand over this complex task to 
OSHA. us The EPA's action was based on the contention that expo-
ences in the scope and approach of pre-TSCA laws which often render these laws inefficient 
for regulation of a specific chemical, addressing the Department of Transportation specifically, 
stating that: 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) regulates interstate transportation of haz-
ardous substances under several authorities, including the Department of Transpor-
tation Act, the Transportation of Explosives Act, and the Hazardous Cargo Act. 
DOT has defined several classes of hazardous materials, and its Hazardous Materials 
Regulations Board plans further classification based upon health hazards. Although 
some testing for effects of hazardous substances is involved in the implementation of 
these regulations, substances are classified primarily from the perspective of hazards 
involved in their transportation and possible spills from accidents. Most of the prob-
lems of toxic substances discussed in this report relate to aspects of their use rather 
than to transportation and spills. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
116 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
118 Asbestos: Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing, Im-
portation, and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 763). 
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sure to asbestos was affecting or had affected a great number of 
school employees in their workplace. It was thus a workplace prob-
lem, which should be handled pursuant to the OSH Act. 119 The ~P A 
made this decision despite comments from several sources stating 
that exposure to the carcinogen was occurri~g through the use of 
certain consumer products, through ambient air concentrations, and 
through other environmental avenues besides the workplace. 12o 
The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce became alarmed when it 
learned of the EPA's questionable administrative decision. This sub-
committee called for an investigatory hearing on the matter.121 The 
congressional investigation revealed that the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) applied a cost-benefit formula to convince the 
EPA not to regulate this particular asbestos problem through TSCA. 
The OMB found that the cost of removing or sealing the asbestos 
ranged from $96,000 to $206,000 for each case of student cancer that 
would be avoided, but that the value of the average student's life 
was only estimated to be $22,000. 122 
OMB's calculation of the actual value of a student's life notwith-
standing, the subcommittee became outraged when it discovered the 
EPA's true basis for referral. The subcommittee noted that the 
EPA's behavior was "directly contrary to the law, the legislative 
history of that law, and prior interpretation of that law by [the 
EP AJ. "123 The subcommittee further stated that it was very troubled 
by the fact that OMB officials distorted section 9 of TSCA to suit 
their own budgetary approach. 124 
Despite a denial from Deputy Administrator Barnes that the reg-
ulatory referral of asbestos in schools was based on the OMB oost-
benefit analysis rather than on a valid finding of jurisdictional over-
lap,125 the EPA revoked the referral in March of 1985. The EPA 
issued proposed rulemaking regarding the school asbestos problem 
under section 6 of TSCA in January of 1986. 126 At that time, the 
119 I d. at 3752. 
120 House Panel Criticizes EPA Referral, Ethics of Human Price Tag in Cost/Benefit, 9 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 69 (Apr. 19, 1985). 
121Id. at 70. 
122Id. at 69. 
123 Id. at 6:3-70. 
124 Id. 
125Id. at 69. 
126 Asbestos: Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing, Irn-
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EPA identified asbestos as a clear TSCA problem because of the 
broad degree of exposure of people to the substance in numerous 
and varied situations. 127 In direct contradiction to earlier EPA state-
ments, the Agency indicated that statutes limited to specific forums 
of exposure, such as OSHA, which addresses only the workplace, as 
well as single-media statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, are insuf-
ficient to check the pervasive presenee of the substance. 128 
The EPA's attempted referral of regulatory responsibility for as-
bestos in schools exemplifies the disquieting potential for abuse 
through delegation of responsibility under section 9 of TSCA. By 
labelling a toxic substance threat as a workplace issue, the EPA can 
ignore the legislative objectives of TSCA.129 With a referral to 
OSHA, the inadequacies of the OSH Act and the budgetary problems 
faced by the agency threaten adequate regulation of harmful toxic 
chemicals. 
B. Other Section 9 Referrals to OSHA 
In addition to the attempted asbestos referral, the EPA has 
avoided regulatory responsibility under TSCA by invoking its sec-
tion 9 authority on six other occasions. Through formal section 9(a) 
procedures, the Agency has issued three referrals, all of which trans-
ferred authority to OSHA. Based on the flexible language of section 
9(&), the EPA has informally referred regulatory responsibility for 
three other chemicals. Again, each of these referrals was directed 
portation, and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 763). 
127 I d. at 3753. 
128 Id. The Agency noted that although "OSHA may set exposure for workers ... there 
may be venting into the atmosphere; EPA under the Clean Air Act may regulate ambient 
emissions, but not workplace or consumer exposures, and in each step only a fraction of the 
risk is evaluated." Accordingly, comprehensive TSCA regulation was appropriate. Id. 
129 See OMB Blocks Asbestos-Ban Final Rule; Decision Left to Bush Team, Elkins Says, 
12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1523 (Jan. 20, 1989). In one of its last official actions under the 
Reagan Administration, OMB blocked a proposed rule under section 6 of TSCA which was 
intended by the EPA to comprehensively phase out asbestos use over a seven-year period. 
The rule would immediately ban the use of asbestos in roofing felts, flooring felts, felt-backed 
sheet flooring, vinyl asbestos floor tile, asbestos clothing, a:ld asbestos-cement pipe. All other 
uses of asbestos would be phased out in seven years, resulting in a ban of 95% of the asbestos 
now used in products and a complete ban of asbestos in consumer items. 
According to Charles Elkins, the Director of the Office of Toxic Substances, the technicalities 
of the rule had been worked out and implementation of the rule was dependent on OMB-EPA 
negotiations. OMB rejected the rule, Elkins suggested, because of the "aggressive" nature of 
the rule and because "it costs money." I d. 
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toward OSHA. This section 9 activity prompted substantial delay in 
the execution of affirmative regulatory measures to control these 
harmful toxins, and, in most cases, subsequent regulatory efforts 
have been criticized as less than satisfactory solutions to health and 
safety concerns. 
1. Section 9(a) Formal Referrals 
Since the enactment of TSCA, the three formal section 9(a) reg-
ulatory referrals to OSHA have transferred regulatory authority for 
the following chemicals: 4,4'-Methylenedianiline (4,4'-MDA), 1,3-
butadiene, and a group of glycol ethers. 130 
In 1985 the EPA conducted its first formal referral to OSHA by 
delegating regulatory responsibility of 4,4'-MDA.131 4,4'-MDA is an 
industrial chemical used in the production of polyurethane foams, 
epoxy resins, wire coatings, and dyes. 132 According to the EPA, 660 
workers are exposed to the toxin in manufacture and thousands of 
others are exposed in processing procedures. 133 In July, 1975, the 
EPA conceded that 4,4'-MDA presents an unreasonable risk to ex-
posed workers and that "a workplace standard may prevent or re-
duce the risks to a sufficient extent. "134 The Agency noted that 
because the toxic substances were only found in the workplace, 
OSHA referral would be appropriate. 135 
Since the EPA's referral of 4,4' -MDA, it has taken OSHA over 
three years to promulgate workplace safety regulations for the chem-
ical. 136 Even after the proposed regulation was finalized by OSHA, 
publication of the regulation was delayed for a year by OMB, which 
deemed the action to be a low priority.137 OMB's refusal to act 
subsequent to OSHA's completion of the project resulted in harsh 
130 4,4'-Methylenedianiline; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1985); 1,3 Butadiene; Decision to Report to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,393 (1985); Toxic and Hazardous Sub-
stances Control; 2-Methoxyethanol, 2-Ethoxyethanol and Their Acetates; Referral for Addi-
tional Action, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,488 (1986). 
131 4,4' -Methylenedianiline; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1985). 
132 [d. at 27,675. 
133 [d. 
134 [d.; see also EPA Announces Regulatory Referral of 4,4'-MDA to OSHA Under TSCA 
§ 9,9 Chern. Rep. (BNA) 339 (June 28, 1985). 
135 50 Fed. Reg. 27,680 (1985). 
136 4,4'-MDA: OSHA, OMB Finishing Work on Proposal; CMA, Steelworkers Criticize 
Year-Long Delay, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 674-75 (July 29, 1988). 
137 [d. 
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criticism of both agencies by the chemical industry and workers 
alike. 138 
The delay in regulation of 4,4'-MDA subsequent to referral from 
the EPA to OSHA typifies the problems that result when regulatory 
activity is simply passed from one agency to another. Ultimately, 
delay in regulation for a given chemical increases the degree and 
scope of harmful health effects from exposure to the chemical. This 
"regulatory lag" is particularly troublesome with respect to OSHA, 
because the agency faces numerous hurdles in the standard-setting 
process. As the 4,4'-MDA referral further demonstrates, the prom-
inent role of OMB as overseer of such regulatory activity poses an 
even more serious threat to checking exposure through prompt reg-
ulatory activity. 
In October, 1985, the EPA formally referred regulation of 1,3-
butadiene, a chemical used in the synthetic rubber industry, to 
OSHA. 139 Between 4,800 and 7,800 workers in the synthetic rubber 
industry are exposed to the toxin. 140 Although OSHA already reg-
ulated the chemical, the EPA believed that the OSHA standard was 
unreasonably high, and considered regulating 1,3-butadiene under 
TSCA.141 The OSHA standard was 1,000 ppm for 1,3-butadiene. 142 
OSHA refused to lower the standard even in the face of EPA advice 
that the standard should be 1 ppm rather than 1,000 ppm. 143 Exposed 
workers attempted to fight for reduction of the standard through a 
labor union petition for a lower emergency temporary standard, but 
OSHA ignored their efforts. 144 
There is probably no hope of effective regulation of 1,3-butadiene 
under TSCA because the EPA formally surrendered regulatory re-
sponsibility to OSHA by withdrawing its proposed rulemaking. Nat-
urally, industry-affiliated commentators view regulation under 
OSHA as the most viable alternative for the chemical, due to the 
lower financial burden of maintaining a 1,000 ppm OSHA standard 
138 4,1/ -MDA: Proposal Expected Within 'Next Few Weeks,' OSHA Head Tells Rulernaking 
Cornrnittee Mernbers, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 866-67 (Sept. 9, 1988). 
139 1,3-Butadiene; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
50 Fed. Reg. 41,393 (1985). 
14°Id. 
141 See Rulernaking Begins on Potential Carcinogen 1, 3-Butadiene, Empl. Safety & Health 
Guide (CCH) No. 779, at 1 (Apr. 15, 1986). 
142 OSHA Seeks Cornrnents on 1, 3-Butadiene Risks, Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 
No. 764, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1985). 
143 See id. 
144 See Rulernaking Begins on Potential Carcinogen 1, 3-Butadiene, Empl. Safety & Health 
Guide (CCH) No. 779, at 1 (Apr. 15, 1986). 
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as compared to a 1 ppm TSCA standard. 145 Conversely, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, an environmental interest group, argues 
that only TSCA will adequately protect workers and the environ-
ment from the toxin. 146 
The circumstances surrounding the 1,3-butadiene referral belie 
the fact that political maneuvering, rather than pursuit of legislative 
goals with regard to toxic chemical regulation, is the order of the 
day. One must puzzle at an agency charged with a mandate to 
preserve the safety of the workplace that accepts a 1,000 ppm stan-
dard as appropriate in the face of a recommended 1 ppm standard. 
Had regulation of the chemical been retained under TSCA, manu-
facturers of the chemical would be forced to participate in the rule-
making process, thereby easing the rulemaking burden on the 
agency and encouraging the agency to pursue a more reasonable 
regulatory plan for the chemical. If the regulatory plan for 1,3-
butadiene under TSCA remained unacceptable based on public safety 
and health considerations, the regulations would be open to challenge 
through TSCA's citizen suit provision. 
The most recent formal referral to OSHA was the glycol ether 
referral in May, 1986. 147 Glycol ethers are used in solvents for print-
ing, painting, woodworking, and for finishing paint coatings on au-
tomobiles. 148 Following the TSCA requirement, the EPA found that 
OSHA could reduce the health risks of the toxin to a sufficient 
extent, and referred regulation to that agency.149 The EPA made 
this finding in spite of its earlier admission that it was unaware of 
the impact of glycol ethers used in consumer products. The EPA 
deemed consumer exposure irrelevant because it perceived none to 
exist, and referral soon followed. 150 
Once again, manufacturers claimed that if any regulation had to 
be implemented for glycol ether it should be through OSHA.151 An-
other environmental interest group, the Environmental Defense 
Fund, commented to the contrary that the EPA should utilize TSCA 
to solve the glycol ether problem. Without an opportunity for judicial 
145 See 1,3-Butadiene Risks; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,393 (1985). 
146 See id. 
147 Toxic and Hazardous Substances Control; 2-Methoxyethanol, 2-Ethoxyethanol and Their 
Acetates; Referral for Additional Action, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,488 (1986). 
148Id. 
149 I d. at 18,495. 
150 I d. at 18,488. 
151Id. 
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review or an ability to bring citizen suits, the opposition had no way 
to prevent the OSHA referral. 
2. Section 9(d) Informal Referrals to OSHA 
Section 9(d) informal referral differs from section 9(a) referral 
because informal referrals are based purely on policy grounds. In-
formal referrals occur prior to any EPA determination as to whether 
a chemical poses an unreasonable risk under TSCA section 4(f).152 
These informal referrals are the most convenient method for Agency 
diversion of regulatory responsibility under TSCA. To date, there 
have been three section 9(d) referrals to OSHA. 
The EPA issued its first informal section 9(d) policy-based referral 
to OSHA in July, 1986, for toluenediamine (TDA).I53 Manufacturing 
of TDA exposes approximately 750 workers, and 750 more are ex-
posed in the use and processing of the chemical. 154 According to the 
EPA, it referred TDA regulation under section 9(d) rather than 
under section 9(a) for expeditious purposes. 155 
Curiously, the EPA initially proposed rulemaking for TDA under 
TSCA, but terminated the project because attempts at negotiation, 
rather than formal rulemaking, failed. 156 It is not clear why the 
Agency did not pursue formal TSCA rulemaking for TDA. The ab-
sence of judicial review for section 9 makes any clarification diffi-
cult. 157 The EPA has not offered an explanation as to why formal 
TSCA rulemaking was not pursued, and, indeed, it need not do SO.158 
The toluenediamine referral demonstrates the tremendous discretion 
of the EPA in controlling the impact of toxic chemical regulation in 
a given situation. 
In June, 1986, the EPA referred 4,4'-methylene bis (2-chloroani-
line), known as MOCA, to OSHA through section 9(d).159 MOCA is 
used to manufacture polyurethane articles and surface coatings, and 
workers in 400 United States companies are exposed to the sub-
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(0 (1982). 
153 Toluenediamines; Termination of Investigation Concerned With Occupational Exposure, 
51 Fed. Reg. 25,070 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 799). 
154 [d. at 25,071. 
155 See id. 
156 [d. 
157 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
158 See Toluenediamines; Termination of Investigation Concerned with Occupational Expo-
sure, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,070 (1986). 
159 4,4' -Methylene Bis (2-Chloroaniline): Termination of Regulatory Investigation and Trans-
fer of Information to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,836, 
22,837 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 764). 
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stance. 160 MOCA is a carcinogen which presents a significant threat 
to workers when inadequately contained in dispensing drums. 161 Al-
though the presence of MOCA in the environment is prominent, the 
EPA refused to determine whether it met the unreasonable risk 
threshold, and instead simply transferred the problem to OSHA on 
policy grounds. 162 
The EPA chose to defer to OSHA in this manner, ignoring strong 
overtures from industry calling for regulation of the chemical under 
TSCA rather than the OSH Act. The Polyurethane Manufacturers 
Association (PMA) specifically asked the EPA to consider issuing a 
comprehensive MOCA packaging and labeling rule under TSCA that 
would incorporate dispensing drum specifications. 163 Only under 
TSCA could such a broad rule be produced, which would both ad-
dress worker protection and facilitate industrial management. The 
EPA, however, ignored both industry and environmentalist pleas 
for comprehensive regulation of MOCA through TSCA, and relieved 
itself of responsibility for the chemical through a convenient 9(d) 
referral. 
OSHA's treatment of MOCA over the sixteen-year period that 
has elapsed since serious concerns over the chemical were first voiced 
has been highly criticized. 164 This criticism has resulted in part from 
the leak of an internal OSHA report that included the chemical in 
its "dormant standards project," by which OSHA simply shut down 
its regulatory efforts for certain chemicals. 165 Because MOCA was 
referred back to OSHA from the EPA, little action has been taken 
with respect to the chemical even though it has been more solidly 
linked to cancer.166 Accordingly, labor unions have been forced to 
petition OSHA for an emergency standard to check MOCA expo-
sure. 167 A ban or limitation of MOCA under TSCA would have put 
an end to the regulatory follies surrounding MOCA, and, more im-
16°Id. at 22,837. 
161Id. 
162 See id. 
163 Id. at 22,838. 
164 MaCA: 14 Years of Delay, Neglectfrom OSHA; Disturbing Resultsfrom a Major NIOSH 
Study, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1008-11 (Dec. 2, 1987). 
165 See id. at 1009. Reagan Administration critics in Congress sharply attacked the "Dormant 
Standards" Report, as did organized labor. In response to House subcommittee questioning 
on the Report, then-OSHA Administrator Thorne Auchter labelled the Report as simply a 
"planning document" in an effort to minimize its impact. Id. 
166 I d. at 1010. 
167 Id. at 1008-10. 
1989] TSCA REFERRAL 105 
portantly, finally would have addressed health and safety concerns 
regarding the chemical. 168 
In March, 1986, the EPA referred the regulation of formaldehyde 
to OSHA through a section 9(d) informal referral procedure. 169 Ex-
posure to formaldehyde occurs in the production of disinfectants, 
preservatives, textiles, and in the manufacture of apparel. 170 The 
EPA has designated formaldehyde to be a carcinogen. 171 According 
to the EPA, 800,000 workers are exposed to formaldehyde in the 
apparel manufacturing industry alone, as well as workers in thirty 
other industries. 172 
The EPA stated that because OSHA issued a proposal for a gen-
eral formaldehyde standard, OSHA thus demonstrated that its sta-
tutory authority could prevent the formaldehyde risk to workers 
engaged in apparel manufacturing to a sufficient extent. 173 This basis 
for referral implies that any agency that can issue a proposed reg-
ulatory standard for a toxic substance is capable of regulating that 
substance to a sufficient extent. One must question whether Con-
gress intended this type of mechanical policy approach in laying the 
guidelines for the section 9(d) referral process. It simply makes no 
sense to suggest that Congress enacted TSCA as a comprehensive 
statute for the regulation of toxic chemicals in a broad spectrum of 
situations, and yet included a provision by which the EPA could 
summarily dismiss regulation based on the wholly unsupported rep-
resentations of another agency. 174 
168 EPA has included MOCA as a chemical subject to its new Comprehensive Assessment 
Information Rule under section 8(a) of TSCA. This rule, however, is merely a data organization 
measure, taken by the Agency to reduce duplicative reporting requirements. See EPA Ad-
ministrator Signs Final Version of Comprehensive Assessment Information Rule, 12 Chern. 
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1195-96 (Nov. 4, 1988). 
169 Toxic and Hazardous Substances Control; Formaldehyde; Termination of Regulatory 
Investigation Concerned with Occupational Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 9649 (1986) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. § 765). 
17°Id. 
171Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 9470. 
174 Since referral from the EPA, OSHA's handling of formaldehyde has been attacked in 
administrative policy circles as well as in the courts, casting further doubt on the EPA's 
referral logic. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently heard 
argument between union workers, OSHA, and industry on the formaldehyde standard in Auto 
Workers v. OSHA, No. 87-1743 (D.C. Cir.). OSHA's November, 1987, reduction of the 
formaldehyde standard from 3 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm still leaves 20 to 30 percent 
of the working population unprotected, according to J. Davitt McAteer of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Law Center, who argued for the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
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V. TRACING THE SECTION 9 PARADOX THROUGH THE 
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF TSCA 
A. Congressional Intent in Including Section 9 
The legislative history of TSCA cites the Act as a solution to the 
problematic loopholes of prior legislation regulating toxic substances, 
as well as a response to increasing public health concerns about the 
substantial amount of toxic substances being introduced into the 
environment. 175 Both the House and the Senate noted that no federal 
law regulating toxic substances at that time provided comprehensive 
control, and that it was their intent that TSCA would achieve this 
purpose. 176 With regard to the OSH Act specifically, it is apparent, 
through examination of both the Senate and House reports, that 
Congress intended TSCA to be a supplement to existing OSHA 
law. 177 
The committee reports all describe section 9 as a mechanism to 
prevent duplicative regulation and wasted resources. 178 Although 
some early versions of TSCA prohibited any EPA action arguably 
within the jurisdiction of another agency,179 these proposals were 
dismissed. Such proposals conflicted with the central congressional 
intent of providing legislation that would cure the ills of prior toxic 
substance laws. Accordingly, the final version included section 9(d) 
to require annual reports to Congress concerning the efforts of the 
Workers' Union. Counsel for OSHA claimed that the residual risks of cancer from formalde-
hyde exposure are insignificant under the revised standard. Formaldehyde: D.C. Circuit 
Hears Oral Argument on Challenge to OSHA Exposure Standard, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. 
(BNA) 1846-47 (Mar. 17, 1989). 
175 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4, reprinted in TCSA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 7, at 411-12; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 159-60. 
176 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 7, at 414; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 158. 
177 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 77, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 7, at 193. The Senate Report repeatedly cites the purpose of inter-agency amendments 
to maximize the effectiveness of TSCA as a supplement to OSHA: "These amendments . . . 
would clarify that the Act is intended to complement and supplement existing laws and 
regulations such as occupational, health and safety requirements." [d. 
178 "All three committee reports-House, Senate and Conference-describe the purpose of 
section 9(a) as being to avoid overlapping or duplicating regulation while providing full pro-
tection for health and the environment." Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10 (quoting 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 45, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
7, at 452). 
179 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 7, at 418. 
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EPA Administrator to consult with other agencies so that "maximum 
enforcement of th[ e] act" would be achieved. 180 
B. The Post-Enactment History of Section 9 
Section 9 of TSCA has never been construed by a court, nor has 
the EPA ever issued formal regulations interpreting the provision. 181 
The EPA has, however, issued two policy statements on the section. 
The first was a 1984 Statement by Deputy Administrator Alvin AIm, 
which briefly touched on section 9 issues. 182 The second was a 1985 
statement directly addressing section 9(a) by Acting General Counsel 
Gerald H. Yamada. l83 The EPA also issued a memorandum of un-
derstanding (MOD) in 1986 that specifically addressed section 9(a) 
referrals between the EPA and the Department of Labor (DOL).l84 
A memorandum of understanding is an administrative policy docu-
ment that addresses the approach that two or more agencies will 
take with respect to an area of regulatory overlap. 
Policy statements by the EPA addressing section 9 of TSCA vary 
greatly in the degree of guidance that they offer the Agency with 
respect to a referral decision. The earlier "AIm Policy" offered min-
imal direction, stating generally that the EPA is to refer regulatory 
responsibility to the DOL when "occupational exposures constitute 
all or most of the hazards posed by the chemical," and when a 
workplace standard would be the most effective method of regula-
tion. 185 The "Yamada Policy," however, issued specific section 9(a) 
referral guidelines and stated that the EPA has the obligation to 
liberally use the section to refer regulatory responsibility. 186 
The 1985 Yamada Policy of frequent referral is possible largely 
because of the tremendous amount of Agency discretion with respect 
to section 9 flowing from the absence of judicial review. 187 Not only 
does the policy urge referral away from the EPA whenever feasi-
180 15 U.S.C. § 2608(d) (1982). 
181 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
182 See id. (citing Alvin Aim, Deputy Administrator, EPA Interim Policy for Referring 
Workplace Exposure Problems to the Department of Labor (Aug. 22, 1984)). 
183 ld. 
184 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Department of Labor, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 
~ 8804, at 8713-16 (Mar. 4, 1986). 
185 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10 (citing Aim, supra note 182). 
186 ld. 
1871d. 
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ble,188 particularly if the OSH Act is involved,189 but the policy also 
stresses that EPA disagreement with the regulatory approach of 
another agency is not a sufficient basis to withhold referral. 190 In the 
face of this pro-referral mandate, the Agency does concede that 
situations may exist where section 9(a) referral is not appropriate. 191 
One basis given for the Yamada Policy was a subtle difference in 
the language of sections 9(a) and 9(b).192 The statutory language 
distinction relied upon by the Agency as dictating referral under all 
circumstances is largely a semantical one. Section 9(a) requires an 
EPA report documenting the prospect of referral where a non-EPA 
statute "may" adequately regulate a chemical, while section 9(b) 
requires such a report when an EPA -administered statute other than 
TSCA "could" adequately regulate. 193 The Yamada Statement mag-
nifies this distinction to the point of considering it the equivalent of 
a congressional order for referral away from TSCA under section 
9(a) at every opportunity. 194 
The Agency's reliance on the difference between sections 9(a) and 
9(b) for this proposition is misplaced for two reasons. First, the 
distinction relates to reporting requirements, not to referral itself. 
If Congress had intended an across-the-board referral approach with 
respect to section 9(a) jurisdictional overlap, it would not have de-
manded a simple report documenting referral prospects. To effec-
tuate such an approach, Congress would have demanded referral 
outright whenever it appeared that another agency could regulate a 
chemical. The requirement of a report evaluating referral prospects, 
on the other hand, permits at least limited oversight of EPA action. 
At the same time, the reporting requirement forces the EPA to 
make a reasoned assessment of regulatory alternatives for a specific 
chemical. 195 Absent a compulsory review of regulatory alternatives, 
188 See id. "TSCA would not create 'overlap' [but rather] TSCA would be restricted to filling 
'gaps' in existing statutory authority." I d. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. EPA's policy choices are subordinated to those of other agencies in many cases 
of potentially overlapping jurisdiction. I d. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)-(b) (1982). 
194 See Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
195 Contrary to the Yamada Statement, the EPA itself noted the need for an efficient 
approach to interagency cooperation in commenting on the Senate Bill, S.766, that: 
Several amendments are being proposed to the act to provide for the maximum 
cooperation and coordination among the several agencies of the Federal Government 
which have programs and responsibilities concerned with toxic substances. These 
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TSCA may not be enforced as a gap-filler for prior inefficient toxic 
chemical legislation. 196 
Second, the legislative history indicates that Congress was partic-
ularly concerned with the potential for abuse through convenient 
undocumented 9(b) inter-agency referral. 197 Contrary to the Yamada 
Statement's position that the "could regulate" language points to a 
lower standard for 9(a) intra-agency referral, it is equally plausible 
that the 9(b) "could regulate" language is a legislative response to 
address congressional concern about undocumented proceedings 
within the EPA. 
In further support of the pro-referral mandate, the Yamada Policy 
Statement proposed a puzzling "attention-forcing" theory analogiz-
ing section 4(0 to section 9. 198 TSCA section 4(0 requires that test 
data on toxins be submitted to the Administrator, and, upon a de-
termination that regulation is appropriate, that action to regulate 
must be initiated by the Agency within 180 days.199 This provision 
amendments also would clarify that the act is intended to complement and supplement 
existing laws and regulations such as the occupational health and safety requirements. 
Letter from John R. Quarles, Jr., Acting Administrator, Envtl. Protection Agency, to Sen. 
Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Commerce, commenting on the proposed 
Toxic Substances Control Act (June 23, 1975), reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, 
at 77, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 193 (emphasis added). 
196 See id. 
197 The House Conference Report expresses its concern with the tremendous amount of 
discretion afforded to the Administrator under section 9(b): 
[Wjhile it is clear that the Administrator's determination that it is in the public 
interest to use this Act, is a completely discretionary decision not subject to judicial 
review in any manner, it is expected that the Administrator will review the other 
authorities and present the results of that review at the same time the Administrator 
takes action under this Act. While the Administrator's decision to use this Act, 
notwithstanding the other authorities, is unreviewable by any court, a reviewing 
court is expected to require that the Administrator have examined the other author-
ities and present the results of that examination when making the finding that it is 
in the public interest to use this Act. Of course, the requirement to examine other 
EPA laws and to make determinations applies only when the Administrator takes 
regulatory action to protect against an unreasonable risk under this Act. It does not 
apply when the Administrator takes action necessary for the administration or en-
forcement of the Act, such as issuing recordk~eping requirements. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1679, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 698. 
198 See Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
199 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1982). This regulatory provision reads as follows: 
Upon the receipt of - . 
(1) any test data required to be submitted under this chapter, or 
(2) any other information available to the Administrator, 
which indicates to the Administrator that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude 
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may be called an attention-forcing provision because it requires the 
EPA to devote immediate attention to a specific toxin and make a 
prompt decision as to regulation. Offering little explanation, the 
Policy Statement submits that the section 4(0 purpose should be 
attributed to section 9. In other words, the Yamada Policy indicates 
that the Agency should interpret section 9 as mandating a prompt 
decision, and that decision should be in favor of referral whenever 
possible. 
The Agency's attention-forcing theory ignores the central regu-
latory scheme of the Act, under which section 4 both provides for 
aggressive testing of potential hazardous chemicals and forces active 
regulation. 20o The legislative history of the Act does not support the 
Yamada interpretation, as there is no indication whatsoever that the 
section 4(0 mandates should apply to section 9(a).201 On the contrary, 
the attention-forcing theory directly contravenes the congressional 
directive that cooperation with other agencies should be conscien-
tiously conducted to achieve the primary goal of maximum enforce-
ment of TSCA.202 
As discussed in Part III,203 the ambiguity of the sufficient extent 
standard of section 9(a) has left the Agency free to establish its 
referral policy without regard to the broadbased legislative objec-
tives of the Act. Accordingly, the 1985 Yamada Statement main-
tained that the Agency has no affirmative responsibility in making 
a section 9(a) referral decision to consider either the practical ability 
of the second agency to regulate or the cost-effectiveness of regu-
lation by the second agency.204 In so doing, the Agency rejected a 
[d. 
that a chemical substance or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of 
serious or widespread harm to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth 
defects, the Administrator shall, within the 180-day period beginning on the date of 
the receipt of such data or information, initiate appropriate action under section 2604, 
2605, or 2606 of this title to prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk or 
publish in the Federal Register a finding that such risk is not unreasonable. For good 
cause shown the Administrator may extend such period for an additional period of 
not more than 90 days. The Administrator shall publish in the Federal Register 
notice of any such extension and the reasons therefor. A finding by the administrator 
that a risk is not unreasonable shall be considered agency action for purposes of 
judicial review under chapter 7 of title 5. This subsection shall not take effect until 
two years after January 1, 1977. 
200 OTS, TSCA, supra note 2, at 14. 
201 The Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 Env't Rep. (BNA), Monograph No. 24, at 37 (1977). 
202 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
203 See supra notes 69-117 and accompanying text. 
204 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
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reading of section 9(a) based on TSCA provisions as a whole. Under 
a more broad reading, provisions such as section 6(c) strongly sug-
gest that factors like the capability of the second agency to regulate 
and the cost-effectiveness of regulation by that agency should be 
recognized in the section 9(a) decisionmaking process. 
The Agency relies on its argument concerning 9(a) reporting re-
quirements and the absence of a public interest evaluation under 
section 9(a) to support its dismissal of the section 6(c) concerns. 205 
This approach flies in the face of legislative interpretation principles, 
and, more importantly, is repugnant to the purpose of TSCA. There 
is no reason to avoid consideration of the ability of a second agency 
to handle regulation. Nor is there reason to downplay the costs and 
benefits of regulating under TSCA as compared to a different stat-
ute. Certainly, if the purpose of enacting TSCA was to fill the 
regulatory gaps left by other statutes, then ignoring the costs and 
benefits of operating under a different statute renders the Act use-
less. 
Finally, the 1985 Policy Statement discussed the significance of 
TSCA section 9(c), which specifically cites the congressional intent 
to prevent interference with OSHA's jurisdiction in administering 
TSCA. The EPA's position is that its pro-referral policy will be 
enforced even more strongly where OSHA is concerned because the 
entire process of EPA regulation of the workplace by setting 
"OSHA-type" standards under TSCA is suspect.206 The legislative 
history of the Act, however, specifically states that in certain situ-
ations a chemical ban or use limitation under TSCA is preferable to 
an exposure limit, such as those set under OSHA, to protect human 
health and safety and the environment. 207 In acknowledging the 
205 [d. 
206 See id. Yamada contends that since section 6 of TSCA describes EPA regulations for 
"manufacturing," "processing" and "distribution in commerce" or "disposal" and section 6(a)(5) 
provides only for regulation of "commercial use," and not "manufacturing," then, in reading 
section 6(a)(5) against the whole section 6 provision, one may conclude that section 6(a)(5) 
does not extend to regulation of the workplace. [d. at 189. 
207 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 7, at 157-58. The Report from the Senate Committee on Commerce emphasized 
the need for TSCA regulation in lieu of exposure-limit regulation under a different statute: 
While air and water laws authorize limitations on discharges and emissions, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the establishment of ambient air 
standards for the workplace, and the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizes stan-
dards with respect to consumer products, there are no existing statutes which au-
thorize the direct control of industrial chemicals themselves for their health or en-
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express concerns of Congress as dictated through the legislative 
history,208 yet, at the same time, wholly dismissing TSCA as a control 
mechanism for the workplace, Yamada's OSHA argument loses cred-
ibility. 
The Agency has consistently followed the pro-referral directive of 
the 1985 Yamada Policy Statement in enforcing TSCA.209 This sec-
Id. 
vironmental effect (except section 211 of the Clean Air Act, which authorizes the 
regulation of fuel additives). 
While these other authorities will in many cases be sufficient to adequately protect 
health and the environment, the alternative of preventing or regulating the use of 
the chemical in the first instance may be a far more effective way of dealing with 
hazards. If expensive sewage treatment facilities can be avoided, for example, 
through removing dangerous materials from household and industrial wastes, the 
authority to do so ought to be provided. 
The House discusses this need by specifically referring to the failure to adequately regulate 
PCB's under pre-TSCA stat'utes: 
The inadequacies in current authorities to deal with the recognized harm presented 
by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) illustrates the deficiencies in present law to deal 
with known harmful chemicals. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has authority to control the 
discharge of PCBs into the waters. However, there is no means for regulating other 
avenues through which the environment is exposed to PCBs. For example, an esti-
mated three-fourths of the amount of discarded PCB's [sic] have been disposed of in 
landfills. Under existing law there is no authority to deal with such disposal and even 
though water emissions may be restricted, environmental exposure through seepage 
from landfills will continue to occur. 
Intelligent standards for regulating exposures to a chemical in the workplace, the 
home or elsewhere in the environment cannot be set unless the full extent of human 
or environmental exposure is considered. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
7, at 414. 
Perhaps the most enlightening comments in this regard come from the Council on Environ-
mental Quality report which spawned TSCA legislation: 
It is clear that current laws are inadequate to control the actual and potential dangers 
of toxic substances comprehensively or systematically. The controls over manufacture 
and distribution pertain to only a small percentage of the chemical substances which 
find their way into the environment .... For example, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration carefully examines food containers for their effect on food but does not 
address the environmental and health effects of incinerating the containers. With an 
exception of radioactive materials, disposal is not a consideration in any programs 
controlling manufacture. 
But the problems of focus are broader than specific examples. Setting rational 
standards for many pollutants under existing legislation is almost impossible. The 
key factors involved in setting standards are the total human exposure to a substance 
and its total effect on the environment. The focus must be on a particular pollutant 
and all the pathways by which it travels through the ecosystem. Controls over 
distribution approach this perspective, but most fail to consider important environ-
mental factors adequately. 
CEQ, TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 18, at 20, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 7, at 783 (emphasis in original). 
208 Section 9(a) Memorandum, supra note 10. 
209 See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text. 
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tion 9(a) policy results from linguistic hairsplitting of referral lan-
guage. Additionally, the policy hinges on an isolated reading of sec-
tion 9 while ignoring a proper interpretation of the provision in the 
context of the entire TSCA statutory scheme. These factors suggest 
that the 1985 Policy Statement was assimilated as a means of legi-
timizing a preconceived regulatory end, that being minimal use of 
TSCA, based on political and budgetary concerns. 
The memorandum of understanding promulgated with respect to 
section 9 sets forth structured procedural guidelines for referral 
between the EPA and the DOL.210 The EPA-DOL memorandum 
specifies four stages in which the EPA and OSHA are required to 
cooperate in carrying out section 9 action: pre-report notification,211 
pre-report consultation,212 post-report notification,213 and post-report 
consultation. 214 Through this four-stage process it is hoped that the 
agencies will make a reasoned assessment of their regulatory capa-
bilities with respect to a given chemical. The EPA Administrator 
then relies on the information shared by the agencies in deciding the 
ultimate regulatory fate of the chemical. 
A review of the post-enactment history of section 9 in the context 
of the EPA's actual use of section 9 indicates that the Yamada 
Statement has been the driving force behind the Agency's question-
able section 9 track record. The 1985 pro-referral mandate has 
proven to be an advantageous policy tool by which the Agency may 
refer regulation at every turn despite legislative objectives. While 
the EPA-DOL memorandum is instructive as to the inter-agency 
technicalities that must be met to invoke referral activities, it is 
quite clear that the Yamada pro-referral mandate, as a deregulation 
tool, is the precept upon which all section 9 decisions are based. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO PREVENT THE MISUSE OF SECTION 9 OF 
TSCA 
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970,215 the first com-
prehensive environmental statute, federal regulation of toxic sub-
stances has proven to be an exceedingly complex and often disap-
210 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Department of Labor, supra note 184, ~ 8804, at 8713-16. 
211 [d. ~ 8804, at 8715. 
212 [d. ~ 8804, at 8715-16. 
213 [d. ~ 8804, at 8716. 
214 [d. 
215 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
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pointing endeavor.216 The difficulty in mounting an effective attack 
against toxic substances is partly attributable to their ubiquitous 
nature. Toxic substances present themselves in virtually every type 
of medium throughout the course of their existence.217 Because of 
this fact, federal regulation focussing solely on a single medium, such 
as air, water, or soil, has proven too narrow in scope and less 
successful than originally was hoped. 218 
The passage of TSCA stands as a formal recognition by Congress 
that, based on their complex nature, toxic substances require a 
multi-media regulatory approach.219 TSCA exists on paper as a not-
able policy breakthrough in toxic substance control. Nevertheless, 
the Act essentially has failed to provide for comprehensive regulation 
of toxic substances during its thirteen years on the books. 220 
216 See D. DONIGER, supra note 4, at 21. In summarizing the problems of toxic substances 
regulation, Doniger notes: "[tloxic substances regulation ... is characterized by ... problems 
of technological, medical, and economic uncertainty and by the difficulty of balancing incom-
mensurable interests in standard-setting. " [d. 
217 v. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES 
§ 8.1, 1-2. Through their analysis of environmental toxicants, the authors observe that: 
[d. 
Man's physical environment is now contaminated with a myriad of potentially toxic 
substances. These substances are now constituents of nearly everything that man 
uses .... Toxi[nsl enter the environment through complex and interrelated pathways. 
Among the key processes for which man himself is responsible are manufacture, 
consumption and disposal. 
218 CEQ, TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 18, at 21, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 7, at 784. In their 1971 Report on toxic substances, the Council on 
Environmental Quality concluded that: 
[d. 
The characteristic pervasiveness of toxic substances makes it difficult for the media-
oriented programs to engage in adequate and efficient research, monitoring, and 
control activities for such substances .... 
The scope of EPA's authority provides a basis for an integrated approach to toxic 
substances. However, such an approach cannot be accomplished simply by coordi-
nating the activities of existing media-oriented programs. The activities themselves 
must be conducted on an integrated basis. 
219 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in TSCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 7, at 158. In passing TSCA the Senate noted the inadequacies of media-oriented or "non-
comprehensive" regulation of toxic substances and expressed their intent that TSCA serve as 
a mode of comprehensive regulation: 
[d. 
While individual agencies may be authorized to regulate occupational, environmental, 
or direct consumer hazards with respect to a chemical substance, there is no agency 
which has the authority to look comprehensively at the hazards associated with the 
chemical . . . . The bill would grant the Environmental Protection Agency the 
authority to look at the hazards in total. 
220 See D. DONIGER, supra note 4, at 144. In his case study of VOC regulation, David D. 
Doniger examines how the separate treatment of VOC regulation by OSHA and the EPA 
resulted in ineffective overall control of VOCs. Upon making this conclusion, Doniger goes on 
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The ineffectiveness of TSCA is primarily attributable to poor leg-
islative drafting and inappropriate enforcement of the Act's provi-
sions. 221 Section 9 suffers from both of the aforementioned regulatory 
inadequacies. The section 9 legislative loophole facilitates deregula-
tion by enabling the EPA to ignore a toxic hazard through referral 
to another agency whose powers overlap with those of the EPA's. 
Because toxic substances simultaneously present themselves in sev-
eral areas, jurisdictional overlap occurs fairly often, making such an 
approach quite convenient. 222 Although the Agency's manipulation 
of section 9 in this manner directly contradicts the purpose of the 
Act, this activity continues unchecked. 
Recognition of a problem is the first step on the path to its solution. 
Hence, increased public awareness and involvement is the first step 
toward remediation of the section 9 loophole. The second step is 
congressional action in response to public concerns. TSCA must be 
amended to afford jtmicial review of section 9 delegations. The third 
to point out that TSCA has failed as a means of solving the problems of fragmented federal 
regulation of toxic substances: 
Id. 
At no point did Congress take a comprehensive look at the entire problem and 
attempt to design a single control system that covers the full life-cycle of a chemical, 
from invention to disposal, through all the media in which it may be found. Even the 
far-reaching 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act is not such a system. It fills the gaps 
in the network of controls created by other laws . . . . But the enormously complex 
patchwork remains in effect. 
221 See Silbergeld Calls on Congress to Examine EPA Administration of Chemical Cont1@l 
Law, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 36 (Apr. 8, 1988). At a hearing of the Science, Research 
and Technology Subcommittee of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, Ellen 
K. Silbergeld, who is a senior Environmental Defense Fund scientist, a member of the EPA 
Science Advisory Board, and President-elect of the Society for Occupational and Environ-
mental Health, testified that Congress must examine the gaps and loopholes in TSCA. Ac-
cording to Silbergeld, the EPA has improperly interpreted the law, assuming the burden of 
proof of thoroughly demonstrating chemical toxicity prior to regulating rather than considering 
a chemical "guilty until proven innocent." Silbergeld told the subcommittee that, at the hands 
of EPA, "the decade history of [TSCAl has been abused of discretion." Id. 
In an oversight hearing on TSCA held by the House Government Operations Subcommittee 
on Environmental, Energy and Natural Resources the Act was labeled an "underachiever" 
by Rep. Edolphus Towns (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Mike Synar (D-Okla.). Charles L. Elkins, the 
Director of the Office of Toxic Substances, agreed with the Subcommittee, testifying that "[ilt 
is clear . . . that the current level of accomplishment of the existing chemical program is 
inadequate." According to Elkins, the TSCA requirement that EPA rulemaking be supported 
by substantial evidence on the entire rulemaking record has significantly slowed progress 
under the Act. The administration, stated Elkins, not the EPA, has refused to seek a legis-
lative amendment of the substantial evidence requirement. Elkins Says Some TSCA Require-
ments Slow Action on Suspect Existing Chemicals 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1012-13 (Oct. 
7, 1988). 
222 See D. DONIGER, supra note 4, at 144-45 (citing Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, 
Joint Regulatory Developments, 1 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1916-21 (Mar. 1, 1978)). In 1978 
EPA, OSHA, FDA and CPSC reported that regulations were being developed by two or more 
of these agencies for at least 23 substances or groups of substances. Id. 
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and final step is amendment of section 9(a) to include the public 
interest as a factor in making inter-agency referrals so that impor-
tant considerations, such as public safety and health concerns, will 
not be dismissed by the Agency in making such regulatory decisions. 
The only way to effect change in TSCA enforcement is to raise 
public awareness and activity so that Congress will be influenced to 
take action. With respect to the OSH Act, particularly, workers and 
their representatives, unions and public interest groups, must rec-
ognize the negative impact of section 9 referrals to OSHA, and must 
pressure Congress into acting to solve this distressing situation. As 
examination of the legislative history of the Act demonstrates, the 
legislators who enacted TSCA intended to remedy the inadequacies 
of prior laws such as the OSH Act. Certainly, these legislators would 
be anxious to see to it that their efforts are not rendered meaningless 
because of administrative abuse through section 9. 223 
Review of the section 9 loophole by the Administrative Conference 
of the United States is the appropriate vehicle for bringing about 
TSCA reform. Recommendations by the Conference to Congress 
with respect to the section 9 referral problem would assuredly prove 
helpful in amending the law. If an amendment for judicial review of 
section 9 is not pursued successfully, the Administrative Conference 
could act as an independent overseer of section 9 action and check 
potential regulatory abuses. Additionally, the EPA could look to 
recommendations of the Administrative Conference to amend its 
internal section 9 policy. 
A. Congressional Action as an Effective Solution 
1. Judicial Review of Section 9 Actions 
The strongest check that Congress could place on section 9 refer-
rals would be denial of complete administrative discretion by pro-
223 Congress may devote some attention to TSCA in 1989 and 1990 in evaluating toxic 
substance control generally as a part of the reauthorization process for the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-92k (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). 
Significant amendment of TSCA in the upcoming year, however, is doubtful. Although bills 
have been submitted to amend TSCA in the course of the past three years, Congress has 
taken no action, excepting passage of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2641-55 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989), to reform the Act. On October 5, 1984, 
Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) proposed a bill (S. 3075) to amend TSCA. See New 
Chemicals, High-Volume Substances to be Tested Under Proposed TSCA Amendments, 8 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 779 (Oct. 12, 1984). Then Senator Dan Quayle (R-Ind.) and Repre-
sentative Thomas A. Luken (D-Ohio) submitted bills in 1987. S. 638, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 
133 CONGo REc. S. 2682 (1987); H.R. 1697, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONGo REc. H1474 
(1987). 
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vi ding for judicial review of these actions. Removing the discretion-
ary language from section 9 and inserting a provision for judicial 
review will give interested parties directly affected by referrals an 
opportunity to challenge abuses. 
It may be argued that judicial review would unreasonably prolong 
active regulation by either the EPA or an alternative agency. This 
contention, however, carries little weight in view of the administra-
tive neglect of legislative intent that has been characteristic of sec-
tion 9 activity. The history of section 9 referral attempts amply 
demonstrates that the EPA is able to disregard the congressional 
intent underlying TSCA by implementing an across-the-board refer-
ral approach. With a judicial review provision in section 9, the 
Agency would be forced to more carefully analyze referral alterna-
tives. At a minimum, judicial review would serve as an obstacle to 
instances of extreme administrative abuse. 
2. Inclusion of a Public Interest Factor in the Section 9(a) Referral 
Process 
Section 9(b) allows for a consideration of the public interest in 
making an intra-agency delegation decision. 224 Why Congress chose 
to disregard public interest concerns in the inter-agency referral 
provision is unknown, but it makes little sense nevertheless. Con-
sideration of the public interest in deciding which agency's statute 
will better control a toxic substance is clearly necessary to achieve 
the purposes of TSCA. Section 9(a) should be amended to mandate 
su'ch a public interest consideration. 
3. Directives for EPA Action Upon Re-Referral of Regulatory 
Responsibility From a Second Agency 
The problem of continuously shifting regulatory responsibility for 
a particular toxic substance from one agency to another, ultimately 
resulting in no regulation whatsoever, also must be recognized and 
dealt with by Congress. As TSCA is written, the EPA may refer 
regulatory responsibility to a second agency on jurisdictional 
grounds through section 9(a), and the second agency may decide not 
to regulate on policy or other grounds. This has the effect of handing 
the problem back to the EPA, and the statute does not address what 
the Agency is then required to do. 225 To provide guidance in these 
grey areas, TSCA must be amended to directly address requisite 
224 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b) (1982); see also supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
225 POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 12, at 160. 
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EPA action upon re-referral by another agency. If the EPA and the 
second agency agree that action should be taken, then upon re-
referral the EPA must be required to initiate action under TSCA 
within the same l80-day period that section 4 requires. 226 
B. Review and Reform of Section 9 By The Administrative 
Conference of the United States 
The eight-year Reagan Administration successfully implemented 
a powerful political mandate for deregulation.227 This mandate 
prompted administrative agencies to ignore, through inaction, the 
legislative directives to which they are subject.228 As a result of the 
Reagan initiative, enforcement in the environmental and occupa-
tional safety and health regulatory areas was substantially weak-
ened. 229 Although improvement in these regulatory areas is pre-
dicted under the Bush Administration,230 the Reagan era has left an 
indelible mark on such regulation. It is difficult to conceive of changes 
in enforcement policy under President Bush that will be so significant 
as to markedly alter the Reagan atmosphere of governmental indif-
ference to environmental and occupational safety and health con-
cerns. 231 Accordingly, the need for independent oversight of regu-
latory agencies remains strong. 
226 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1982). 
227 See Citizen's Group Accuses Administration of Foot Dragging on Health, Safety Rules, 
12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1064-65 (Oct. 14, 1988). According to an October 12, 1988 study 
by Public Citizen, a consumer safety group, the environmental policies of the Reagan Admin-
istration may have cost the lives of thousands, and injured millions more. The report docu-
ments 20 instances in which the Administration, through the Presidential Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief headed by then Vice President George Bush and the Office of Management 
and Budget, thwarted the implementation of federal health and safety regulations on the basis 
of economic concerns. Examples cited by the study included a two-and-one-half year delay in 
the promulgation of OSHA's hazard communication standard, a delay in the implementation 
of OSHA's Ethylene Oxide standard that involved an OMB effort to delete the short-term 
ethylene oxide standard completely, and a delay in asbestos regulation. [d. 
228 In discussing increasing congressional oversight of the EPA as a reaction to the dere-
gulation mechanisms implemented by the Reagan Administration, a House staff member 
observed: 
Lots of people lost faith in the agencies in the 1980s ... [tlhat led to an increased 
amount of vigilance . . . Congress believes that the agency should be doing all the 
tasks given it. There are more mandates than the agency has resources, and the Hill 
believes that the administration ought to put the resources that are needed there. 
Report on Congressional Oversight Role Shows Polar Perspectives of EPA, Congress, 12 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1350 (Dec. 9, 1988). 
229 See id. at 1349. 
230 Overhaul of Pesticide, Chemical Programs Recommended to Bush By Environmental 
Groups, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1316 (Dec. 2, 1988). 
231 It has been reported that Frederick Stiehl, EPA associate enforcement counsel for 
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In the case of TSCA enforcement, an independent evaluation of 
section 9 referrals is necessary if regulatory abuse is to be checked. 
In addition to the inefficiencies inherent in the statutory structure 
of section 9, consideration of past section 9 referrals indicates that 
political influence on Agency action is quite strong. The powerful 
input of the Office of Management and Budget has shifted the focus 
of EPA action under TSCA away from prevention of health hazards 
caused by exposure to toxic substances to an economic approach of 
cost-benefit analysis. 232 OMB has decreed a new administrative 
maxim that ignores TSCA's power to control hazardous substances, 
recognizing the Act only as a data-collecting device that facilitates 
regulatory referral. The General Counsel of the EPA has commended 
this approach by indicating an intent to conform TSCA activity to 
OMB policy.233 Specifically with regard to the TSCA-OSH Act rela-
tionship, OMB has encouraged meetings between EPA, OSHA, and 
OMB officials to discuss section 9 referral policy.234 The questionable 
pesticides and toxic substances, stated at a Government Institutes sponsored TSCA compli-
ance course that he does not expect the Bush Administration to bring about a significant 
improvement in enforcement of the Act: . 
Even if President-elect George Bush makes the EPA administrator a member of 
the cabinet-a move Stiehl called unlikely-environmental enforcement would remain 
at current levels, the EPA attorney said. 
Although Bush has expressed concern about the environment, Stiehl said, budget 
deficit-related resource constraints make it unlikely that significantly increased en-
forcement would occur. 
Investigators Increasingly Emphasize TSCA Criminal Violations, EPA Attorney Says, 12 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1349 (Dec. 9, 1988). 
In recognition of predictions that TSCA enforcement will continue to be weak under the 
Bush Administration, a state environmental official has called for Congress to amend TSCA 
to include a role for state level enforcement of the Act. Roger Kanerva of the Illinois Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency told a House subcommittee in an oversight hearing that control . 
of the emission, discharge, and disposal of toxic chemicals (under state clean air and clean 
water acts, for example), is not complete if the state regulatory agency has no power to limit 
the introduction of toxins into the environment at the production stage. See Elkins Says Some 
TSCA Requirements Slow Action on Suspect Existing Chemicals, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 
1013 (Oct. 7, 1988). 
232 Cf. House Panel Criticizes EPA Referral, Ethics of Human Pricetag in Cost/Benefit, 9 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 69-70 (Apr. 19, 1985) (EPA officials deny that OMB costibenefit 
calculations dictated decision to refer asbestos regulations to OSHA). 
233 1986 Dawns with New Focus on Chemical Regulatory Programs for Toxic Substances, 
Pesticides, and Hazardous Materials, 9 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1363 (Jan. 10, 1986). "The 
change marks a victory for the budget office which sought to impose a strict view of TSCA's 
referral provisions under Section 9." Id. 
234 A 1984 OMB memorandum recommends that a three way meeting between the budget 
office, EPA, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration should be held to discuss 
to "what degree EPA needs to develop occupational standards for chemicals to supplement 
OSHA's standards." TSCA's Use For Occupational Hazards Endorsed by Senators in Letter 
to EPA, 8 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 277 (June I, 1984). 
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behavior of OMB clearly demands aggressive congressional over-
sight action. 235 
The Administrative Conference of the United States is an appro-
priate independent oversight body to check procedural deficiencies 
in administering TSCA arising from the EPA's improper manipula-
tion of section 9 of the Act. The Administrative Conference was 
created by Congress to study and solve problems shared by inter-
acting administrative agencies so that regulatory responsibility will 
truly honor the public interest. 236 The Conference is governed by a 
Council comprised of eleven members appointed by the President, 
half of whom are members of federal regulatory agencies or execu-
tive departments. 237 The Conference itself is comprised of 75 to 101 
members who are experts in the field of administrative law, such as 
attorneys and scholars, with diverse professional backgrounds. 238 
The Administrative Conference has the power to evaluate admin-
istrative procedure not only for technical inefficiency but also with 
235 A report prepared by the National Academy of Public Administration which studied the 
relationship between the EPA, Congress and OMB concluded that the EPA is an underfunded 
agency struggling to meet congressionally set regulatory guidelines while at the same time 
satisfying a "powerful, cost-conscious, and anti-regulatory OMB." Report on Congressional 
Oversight Role Shows Polar Perspectives of EPA, Congress, 12 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1349 
(Dec. 9, 1988) (discussing National Academy of Public Administration, report of Nov. 22,1988 
(40-year history of congressional oversight of executive branch)). According to the report, the 
Reagan Administration has positioned OMB in a supervisory role to monitor all EPA regu-
latory behavior: "In 1984, OMB reviewed 302 rules, and 74 percent were subsequently 
changed; in 1985, 302 rules were reviewed, two-thirds of which were modified after review; 
in 1986, there were 197 reviews with two-thirds changed after review." Id. 
EPA Assistant Administrator Milton Russell, who was interviewed by the National Acad-
emy in preparing the report, observed that Congress and OMB together formed a fragmented 
oversight mechanism which often requires the Agency to waste time and resources meeting 
duplicate oversight demands. See id. The report urges Congress to draft specific legislation 
that will impose statutory limitations on OMB power and procedure. Id. at 1350. 
236 The purpose of the Administrative Conference is stated in the Administrative Conference 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 571-76 (1988), as follows: 
It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide suitable arrangements through which 
Federal agencies, assisted by outside experts, may cooperatively study mutual prob-
lems, exchange information, and develop recommendations for action by proper 
authorities to the end that private rights may be fully protected and regulatory 
activities and other Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously in the 
public interest. 
Id. § 571. 
237Id. § 575(b). 
238 The statute provides: 
The Chairman shall select the members in a manner which will provide broad rep-
resentation of the views of private citizens and utilize diverse experience. The mem-
bers shall be members of the practicing bar, scholars in the field of administrative 
law or government, or others specially informed by knowledge and experience with 
respect to Federal administrative procedure. 
Id. § 573(b)(6). 
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respect to its fairness in light of public interest concerns. 239 The 
Conference, by virtue of its information-gathering function,240 may 
structure a more productive and fair strategy for regulation that 
involves an area of administrative interchange. 241 On this basis, the 
Conference could act as an independent oversight body focussing on 
the section 9 problem. Following an evaluation of prior section 9 
referrals, and an assessment of the EPA's section 9 policy, specific 
suggestions for reform would prove useful to Congress in amending 
TSCA. 
If Congress refuses to act on the suggestions of the Conference, 
then the EPA could remedy past administrative inadequacies by 
revising its section 9 referral policy. In view of the political overtones 
that have shaped past EPA enforcement of TSCA, however, positive 
reform through Congress based on the suggestions of the Adminis-
trative Conference is both more preferable and more likely to occur. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Toxic Substances Control Act was created to provide com-
prehensive control of toxic substances, acting as both a complement 
and a supplement to prior ineffective legislation. Although TSCA 
was initially designed as the appropriate remedy for the prior system 
of toxic substance regulation, which was too dispersed to be suc-
cessful, the Act has proven disappointingly ineffective. TSCA failed 
for two central reasons. First, the unartful drafting of the Act re-
sulted in legislative loopholes, such as section 9. Second, the political 
nature of the administrative agency enforcing the Act has served to 
magnify TSCA's legislative loopholes to further specific political aims 
contrary to the goals of the Act. 
Section 9 of TSCA, although intended to prevent jurisdictional 
overlap and waste of administrative resources by means of regula-
tory referral, has instead become a convenient method to avoid 
239 The Act empowers the Administrative Conference to: 
(1) study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure 
used by administrative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make 
recommendations to administrative agencies, collectively or individually, and to the 
President, Congress, or the Judicial Conference of the United States, in connection 
therewith, as it considers appropriate; 
(2) arrange for interchange among administrative agencies of information poten-
tially useful in improving administrative procedure; and 
(3) collect information and statistics from administrative agencies and publish such 
reports as it considers useful for evaluating and improving administrative procedure. 
[d. § 574. 
240 [d. § 574(3). 
241 [d. § 574(2). 
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regulatory responsibility and hamper the overall goals of the Act. 
The EPA's increasing use of section 9 will not only serve to weaken 
significantly the overall regulatory potential of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, but will help also to encourage lame regulatory activity 
pursuant to earlier inadequate federal legislation. 
The EPA has most often taken advantage of section 9 by charac-
terizing a given problem as a workplace problem and then delegating 
regulatory responsibility to the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration. Because of the many inadequacies of the OSH Act, this 
referral activity is particularly unfortunate and certainly has a neg-
ative effect on the status of toxic substance regulation in the work-
place, and, in turn, on the workplace itself. As the number of section 
9 referrals to OSHA increases, toxic substances problems in the 
workplace will intensify since there is no realistic prospect of OSHA 
reform in the future. Indeed, the Toxic Substances Control Act was 
supposed to be a substantial OSHA reform. 
In order to effect a change in the section 9 provision that will 
prohibit unnecessary referral of regulatory responsibility away from 
TSCA, there must be an increase in public awareness of the problem. 
Particularly, the public should be informed of the direct effect of 
referral to OSHA on the status of toxic substances regulation in the 
workplace. Heightened public awareness will pressure Congress to 
take action to amend TSCA. 
Congress should direct the Administrative Conference of the 
United States to review the EPA's section 9 referral policy. Specif-
ically, the Conference should assess the peed for amendment of 
TSCA to include a provision allowing for a public interest inquiry in 
the inter-agency referral process. Even more importantly, the Con-
ference should investigate permitting judicial review of EPA refer-
rals to other agencies and other EPA-administered statutes. 
With the findings of the Administrative Conference as a guide, 
Congress could amend TSCA to correct the failings that have kept 
it from meeting its potential for controlling toxic substances com-
prehensively. In any case, aggressive congressional action is imper-
ative to stop the misuse of section 9 and to attain the goals of the 
Toxic Substances Control Act. 
